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SOME REFLECTIONS ON FREE ENTRY AND THE RATE
CEILINGS UNDER THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE
Frank W. Smith, Jr.*
CC"CONSUMER protection" in recent years has become one of the
k.. great populist concerns, particularly in the area of consumer
credit. As one should expect, however, there has been no unanimity as
to zwho should be protected from what, or from whom, nor as to the
means of providing such protection. Some feel that consumer protec-
tion still means "self-protection" in the existing system-let the buyer
beware-and view consumer education in a broad sense as perhaps the
most important aspect of providing protection. Others view consumer
protection as a matter outlawing or regulating abusive practices and
giving the consumer more rights. Some emphasize a "litigative" re-
sponse, and suggest that part of the remedy should make legal repre-
sentation more available and provide more effective tools such as class
actions and small claims courts. Still others suggest that the evils and
abuses are not great enough to justify interference with our free market
system. In sum, consumer protection appears quite amorphous, taking
form depending upon how one perceives the problem. Recent literature
such as Caplovitz's The Poor Pay More has done much to highlight
and document various problems and abuses.' However, the title, The
Poor Pay More, tends to obscure the fact that the problems are not
limited to a certain economic strata, i.e., the poor, as well as the fact
that the costs are not solely monetary. The problems affect a broad
segment of people not equipped or able to deal with the marketplace
on its own terms.
At present, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) represents
the approach nearest to a consensus on, or at least a tentative definition
of, the "problems," and of some solutions for providing more protection
in the limited area of consumer sales, consumer loans and credit, and re-
lated remedies.2 However, the UCCC does not purport to cover all of
0 Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. Member of the Virginia Bar.
BA., University of Virginia, 1955; LLB., University of Richmond, 1962; LL.M.,
Harvard, 1968.
1D. CAPLovrrz, Tim POOR PAY MORE, (1967) [hereinafter cited as CAPLovrz].
2 The National Consumer Act, First Final Draft 1969, prepared by the National
Consumer Law Center at Boston College Law School, Brighton, Massachusetts is a
strong consumer dissent to the UCCC. In general the problem areas covered by the
UCCC are dealt with by the National Consumer Act (NCA) although the "solutions"
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what might be considered consumer protection; products liability, food
and drug regulation and other areas are not within its scope.
The UCCC, controversial in many respects, has drawn criticism from
practically every segment of society affected by it. Some think the
UCCC goes too far. Others suggest it does not go far enough; that it
permits excessive interest rates or too low interest rates; and that it does
not offer enough consumer protection.3 Perhaps the most controversial
portion of the UCCC is its proposal regarding what is termed free
entry, and the related structure for interest rates or finance charges which
may be imposed on consumer loans, consumer credit sales, and revolving
or open end charge accounts.
In viewing consumer protection in the field of consumer credit, it
proposed frequently differ. However, the NCA is more comprehensive and covers
many areas not dealt with in the UCCC such as provisions dealing with the use of
credit cards, unfair and deceptive trade practices, warranties, consumer credit insurance,
debt collection practices, class actions, credit reporting, etc. For discussion of the
NCA see Christenson, An Analysis of the UCCC and the National Consumer Act, 12
B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 889 (1971); Kass, Uniform Consumer Credit Code and National
Consumer Act: Some Objective Comparisons, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 82 (1971); Comment,
Consumer Protection under the U3C and the NCA-A Comparison and Recommenda-
tions, 12 AMz. L. REv. 572 (1971); Comment, Limitations on Sales Agreements under
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 56 IOWA L. REV.
171 (1970). Wisconsin has recently passed a comprehensive substitute to the UCCC
based on the NCA. 5 C-.EAIuNGousE REviEw 215, 739 (1971-72).
a For some of the critical treatment of the UCCC see Black, State Variations of the
Unifomn Consumer Credit Code: The Case for Legislative Restraint, 48 DENVER L.J.
239 (1972); Clark, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Assessing Its Impact upon One
State and Plugging Its Loopholes, 18 KAN. L. REv. 277 (1970); Harper, The Uniform
Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 53 (1969); James & Frago-
men, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V and
V1, 57 GEO. L.J. 923 (1969); Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLum. L. REv. 445 (1968); Littlefield, The Plight of the Consumer in
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 48 DENVER L.J. 1 (1971); Littlefield, Preserving
Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loopholes in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.UL. REv.
272 (1969); LoPucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code-or
Lender's Code?, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 335 (1970); Miller, An Alternative Response to the
Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 427 (1971); Murphy,
Another Assault Upon the Citadel: Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver
of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 OHIO S.L.J. 667 (1968); Spanogle, Why Does the
Proposed UCCC Eschew Private Enforcement?, 23 Bus. LAW. 1039 (1968); Spanogle,
The U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIo S.L.J. 624 (1968);
Stengel, Should States Adopt the Uniform Consumer Credit Code?, 60 Ky. LJ. 8
(1971); Turner, The UCCC: A Credit Code for Business, 60 Ky. L.J. 49 (1971);
Comment, Repossession and Deficiency Judgments: Will the Consumer Credit Code
Aid the Consumer or the Vendor?, 2 CONN. L. REv. 202 (1969).
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may be helpful initially to take an overview of some of the underlying
assumptions and concepts. Greatly simplified, and not without disagree-
ment by some, two basic concepts characterize our consumer credit
economy. Frequently with justifiable pride, we point to our (1) free
enterprise system and (2) freedom of contract, to which we pay great
respect in law. In the great debate on consumer protection, one con-
tinually encounters these two concepts and the results of their opera-
tion. Vigorous attacks on and equally forceful defenses of the concepts
are asserted. However, the tension produced by the operation of the
concepts have been shown by both Caplovitz4 and an economic study
by the Federal Trade Commission,5 and graphically described by the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders." It is within this
area of freedom and the resultant tension and glaring paradox that the
UCCC suggest certain adjustments in the existing balance or, as some
would view it, imbalance.
In theory, our system lets consumer demand dictate or determine
within very broad limits what goods or credit will be supplied.7 The
4 CAPLovrz, supra note 1.
5The Federal Trade Commission study concluded, in part, "that without exception
low-income market retailers had high average markups and prices. On the average,
goods purchased for $100 at wholesale sold for $255 in the low income market stores,
compared with $159 in general market stores. For every product specified, low income
retailers had the highest average gross margin reported. When similar makes and
models are compared the differences are striking. For example, the wholesale cost of
a portable TV set was about $109 to both a low-income market and a general market
retailer. The general market retailer sold the set for $129.95 whereas the low-income
market retailer charged $219.95 for the same set. Another example is a dryer, whole-
saling at about $115, which was sold for $150 by a general market retailer and for
$300 by a low-income retailer. Despite their substantially higher prices, net profits on
sales for the low-income market retailers was only slightly higher and net profit return
on net worth was considerably lower when compared to general market retailers:'
F.T.C., EcoNoAic REPORT ON N ST.uLMNT CRaDrr AND RETAIL SALES PAcincEs OF
Disr-mer OF COLU~mIA RErAILERs, x-xl (1968) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT ON
RErAI SALES PRAcnCEs]. See also White, Consumer Credit in the Ghetto: UCCC Free
Entry Provisions and the Federal Trade Commission Study, 25 Bus. LAw. 143 (1969
Special Issue); FTC ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING PRACTICES IN THE
DIsRIar OF COLumRIA AND SAN FaANcisco (1969).6 REPORT OF Tm NATIONAL ADviSORY CoMMIIssIoN ON Clvu. DISORDERS, 274-77 (1968
Bantam ed.)
7 John K. Galbraith challenges this model and asserts that our economic and produc-
tion system, rather than being non directed is- in substantial part a planned economy..
"The initiative in deciding what is to be produced comes not from the sovereign con-
sumer who through the market, issues instructions that bend the productive mechanism
to his ultimate will. Rather it comes from the great producing organization which
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consumer is free to buy whatever goods he may desire, or obtain any
amount of credit or loan, if he can find someone willing to sell or lend
at the price and on the terms he is willing to pay-perhaps, more ac-
curately, if the buyer is willing to "pay the price" and agree to the
terms offered. Generally, the individual is free to buy what he wants,
when he wants it, in whatever amounts, and on whatever terms and
conditions to which he is willing to agree as long as someone is willing
to sell on such terms. Whether there will be someone willing to supply
such goods or services depends largely on whether supplying such wants
is profitable. In some forms of government, what consumer goods will
be available, as well as when they will be available, and in what amounts
and on what terms, are determined largely by some central planning
agency of the state, not by the individual demands or wishes of the
consumer." Our system does not attempt to determine how much of
any type of consumer goods is enough, or to specify at what cost or
sacrifice one should purchase, or to forbid the purchasing of luxury
goods at the expense of denying self or family of necessities. In sum,
one is free to contract as one pleases.
It is readily apparent that these two concepts do not exist in their
pure form today, if they have ever so existed. The great value of the
system is that it lets each individual consumer choose those goods and
services he wants, and within his means determine his quality of life,
by having a free choice of the goods and services he may consume.
However, many are aware of the disaster such freedom can produce
in the form of indebtedness, bankruptcy, unwise purchases, and the like.
The system does not require that one must forego certain pleasures
before going into debt.
In our system, one can choose wisely or unwisely. However, once
a consumer makes a purchase, borrows money, or accepts credit, the re-
sulting agreement, terms, or contract will be enforced by the authority
and power of the state through the courts. Within very broad limits,
the law does not try to determine whether the consumer paid too much,
reaches forward to control the markets that it is presumed to serve and, beyond to
bend the customer to its needs." J. GArArrH, Tim NEw INDUsTaRAL STATE, 18 (1967
paperback ed.). See generally id. at 208-29.
8 Galbraith suggests that the planning in our economy is largely done by the "in-
dustrial state" rather than by the government as in the Soviet Union. Id. at 33-45.
[Vol. 7:235
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whether he should have made the purchase in light of his needs or uses
of his money or credit, or whether he accepted terms which were too
harsh. Only very gross limits are placed on such contracts or their
terms.9
It is important that one keep in mind that in considering consumer
protection in the area covered by the UCCC we are interfering with the
system and dealing with the basic concepts of free enterprise and freedom
of contract as they now function. However, it is also important that one
examine, at least briefly, how the individual consumer functions in this
system, and what the law assumes about the individual entering into the
market system. The law assumes a model that might be called the
"sophisticated consumer"; that is, a consumer who is equipped to deal
with the business community in the marketplace on equal terms, thus
creating some equality of bargaining position and sophistication which
will prevent overreaching. Some have suggested that this "sophisticated
consumer" has at least three essential characteristics.10 First, he knows
that he should shop comparatively and he wants to do so. Second, he
has has the ability, skill and competence to get the best value for his
money. Third, he knows or is aware of his legal rights and liabilities and
is prepared and able to invoke them if necessary. As one can readily
see, this "sophisticated consumer" model frequently, if not commonly,
9 The most prominent check has been through the use of "unconscionability." How-
ever, the concept has no clear boundaries, is a judicially applied principle and thus
for its control effectiveness depends on a case by case application, usually through
litigation and its effectiveness or value as a self applying standard to guide day to day
transactions in the marketplace is certainly questionable. Indeed the price of "uncon-
scionability" may only be that of being caught infrequently. See Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1971). For discussion of the concept
and the cases, see Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Tern 31 U. oF Prrr. L.
Rev. 337 (1970); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YA.e L.J. 757 (1969);
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition,
31 U. or Prrr. L. Rev. 349 (1970); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionability: Un-
conscionability, 31 U. oF Prrr. L. Rev. 1 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscior-
ability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. Rev. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and
Consuner Protection, 31 U. oF Prrr. L. Rev. 359 (1970). For a state by state survey
see 5 CL -AMIGHousE Review 61 (1971).
'OComment, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Consumer Legislation and the Poor].
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is not realistic." Many factors may account for this.'" Often the ex-
perience of the consumer in the marketplace may not have shown the
utility of "shopping around," or may have dulled any perception of the
utility of such conduct, because experience has taught that prices do
not vary. Likewise the consumer's ability to shop for the best buy may
be hindered by the fact that he is primarily shopping for "credit" or
may be hesistant or unwilling to deal with strangers.' 3 Also, the ability
to engage in comparative shopping is affected by mobility, time re-
quired, inconvenience and other factors such as children or a job which
restrict the consumer's ability to shop. Further, assuming the capacity
to "shop around," the ability to select the best value is restricted by lack
of technical knowledge and information, as well as the difficulty of dis-
cerning differences in quality.14 Lack of awareness of his obligation,
e.g., under a conditional sales contract, or of sources of help, also con-
tribute to the inadequacy of the consumer in dealing in the market-
place.' 5 The end result, as several have noted, 6 is that prices paid fre-
11 There appears to be some recent judicial recognition of this. Cf. Swarb v. Lennox,
314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), affirmed, 405 U.S. 191; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 US.
67 (1972); Berg v. Stromme, 79 Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971). There is also legisla-
tive awareness. See Magnuson, Federal Developments in Product Warranty Law, 4 UCC
L.J. 279 (1972).
12 For discussion of these factors, see Consumer Legislation and the Poor, supra note
10, at 748-68.
13 CAPLOViTZ, supra note 1, at 50-57.
14 Consumer Legislation and the Poor, supra note 10, at 751-52. Recent developments
such as unit pricing are helpful to the consumer in making informed choices. How-
ever, unit pricing only provides the price per unit and does not assist the consumer
in determining differences in quality. Perhaps developments under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) will aid in providing the consumer with tech-
nical and test data which frequently would be necessary to make an informed choice.
See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Ci. 1971). Recently there seems to be some
relaxation by governmental agencies in permitting more technical and test data to be
released to the public. See, e.g., 2 CONSUMER NEws 1 (June 1, 1972, Office of Consumer
Affairs Executive Office of the President) noting an announcement by the Food and Drug
Administration of a change in policy about informing consumers of data it has on
file and releasing such information as safety and effectiveness data, adverse reaction and
complaint data, etc.
15 In recent years, the increased availability of legal services has had a significant
effect and much of the push, particularly through litigation, for consumer protection
has come through the efforts of OEO-type legal services and similar legal aid.
16 "Thus the typical low income consumer is not a hardened penny pincher em-
ploying all his skill and ingenuity to stretch his meagre income as far as he can. He
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quently are higher than those obtainable elsewhere, terms are less favor-
able or even quite harsh and onerous, quality is lower or poorer, service
may be inadequate or non-existent, and warranties may be disclaimed
or totally absent. To the extent that the consumer does not fit the model
of the sophisticated consumer, he may encounter those who will take
advantage of or abuse him.17 However, as shown by recent cases, there
are increasing indications that the balance is beginning to shift from a
blind adherence to the sophisticated consumer model. There seems to be
growing recognition that however appropriate or well adapted the
Uniform Commercial Code may be for truly sophisticated commercial
parties, the Code is not completely adequate for consumer transactions
in the marketplace.1 8
One must therefore attempt to determine the real abuses and weigh
the possible remedies against the costs or diminution of values involved
in changes. After identification of the problem, the question of the
cost of correcting the problem arises; the central point is made by the
question-solutions have costs and there are no simple answers. How-
ever, one should realize that the benefits and costs are not easily quanti-
fied and thus not easily weighed. As lawyers, we like to recite "magni-
tude of the risk versus the utility of the conduct," but the formula
suggests a quantification not easily measured. Likewise, the benefit of
remedying consumer abuse is not so easily weighed against the cost of
change in our system of free enterprise and freedom of contract. Many
factors must be weighed-it is not all take and no give, or vice versa.
Further, identification of problem areas is quite difficult. Although
in some areas the magnitude of the problem has been demonstrated at
is an increasingly frustrated and embittered man, with $10,000 desires, $5,000 essential
needs, and $2,000 income, alternately groping for a standard of living he cannot pos-
sibly afford and resignedly paying exorbitant prices for his daily essentials." Consumer
Legislation and the Poor, supra note 10, at 754. Note, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consuzners Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395,
396 (1966).
7It is quite easy at this point to say that the consumer has permitted himself to
be taken advantage of and that he should protect himself as that is the way the system
works. But can all of the "problems" be so easily dismissed or ignored? Should we
permit the system to have such effects and results? In part, these are the questions the
UCCC is asking.
18 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Calif.
1972) (repossession by self-help unconstitutional). But see Ollen v. Bank of America,
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Calif. 1972) (repossession by self-help not "state action"). See
also cases cited supra note 11.
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least in specific localities or populations,19 must the abuses be ignored
until the scope or extent of the problem can be empirically demon-
strated? Clearly it would be hard to justify interfering with the sys-
tem to solve a non-existent problem. However, once areas of abuse
are identified, those opposing solutions because the extent or magnitude
of the problem has not been established should bear some responsibility
for obtaining such necessary evidence. Empirical data would, of course,
be of value in weighing the costs and, without rejecting the desirability
and value of such data, one should realize that the considerations which
must be weighed in consumer protection are not all quantifiable and of
necessity must involve some value judgments and guess work. One may
easily say that it is not time to consider consumer legislation because the
extent of the problem has not yet been established; the "cure should not
be worse than the cough." But one must ask, how much abuse must
there be in a given area before it hurts too much? Does it become a
problem only when it hurts enough of the power structure or other
vested interests, or when it affects a certain percentage of the population?
The traditional arguments for the values of free enterprise and freedom
of contract will be encountered but at some point it seems that society
must consider some of the values of paternalism or make some pa-
ternalistic judgments that enough is enough. The UCCC has identified
some of the problems, and has suggested changes and solutions in these
problem areas.
This paper will attempt to examine some of the values, objective
data, guesswork, and assumptions which are involved in what is perhaps
the most controversial part of the proposed Uniform Consumer Credit
Code, the "freedom of entry provisions" and the related interest rate
structure. Unfortunately, there has been little critical comment oppos-
ing free entry and the related rate structure, as most of the writing
has been highly favorable.20 Yet one cannot help but believe that critical
19 See, e.g., CAPLOVITZ, supra note 1, at 137-54, 155-69 ("Shady" Sales Practices),
(consequences of missed payments and repossession); FTC REPORT oN RETAIL SALES
PRAcncS, supra note 5, at 33-34 (judgments, garnishments and repossession); Project,
Wage Garnishment in Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WAsn. L. REv. 743 (1968).
20 See, e.g., Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consuner Installment Credit,
66 MicH. L. REv. 81 (1967); Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus.
LAW. 209 (1968); Benfield, Interest Ceilings and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
56 A.B.A.J. 946 (1970). Perhaps the most persistent and strongest critic has been Harper
See Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44 N.Y.UL.
REv. 53 (1969); Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entiry,
24 Bus. LAw. 227 (1969).
SYMPOSIUM: UCCC
treatment would be beneficial. On the other hand, perhaps the unanimity
which the proposal has met is indicative of its strength, though many
are skeptical of good theories working in practice.
To a large extent, the two camps in consumer protection, i.e., the
"business interests" and the "consumer advocates," agree there should
be consumer protection and even agree on some of the problems. The
areas of difference are largely in the means of remedying these prob-
lems. In our system the roles played by the various interest groups are
important in arriving at a sound balance and solution.
The UCCC represents a strong consensus on problem areas which
exist in the commercial law and practice as it relates to consumer credit.
Some of the identified problems exist because of specific sanction given
by existing law such as the Uniform Commercial Code; others exist be-
cause there is no specific law or regulatory control, or because they are
the product of agreement or freedom to contract. In a broad sense much
of the UCCC is regulatory or modifies contract law and restricts private
contractual arrangements in consumer transactions. It is indicative of a
recognition that some practices are not to be left to bargaining between
the parties. But beyond this changing of some of the rules, the UCCC
suggests some basic changes in the structure of consumer credit itself by
providing who should be able to play the game under the new rules. As
noted earlier, the most controversial portion of the UCCC is its proposal
on free entry and the related interest rate structure for consumer loans
and credit sales. It is unfortunate that the debate on this issue, not always
informed or enlightened, has tended frequently to obfuscate some of
the real merit of the UCCC apart from the free entry concept; there are
many important provisions of the UCCC apart from free entry. How-
ever, it has been quite easy to oppose the UCCC for various reasons, e.g.,
that it is too pro-business or too pro-consumer, and to gain fairly wide
support in opposition if the argument is cast in terms of free entry and
the exorbitant interest rates the UCCC would permit. It is quite con-
vincing to many to note that the UCCC permits interest rates of 36%
and to compare this to the 12% or 8%, or whatever may be the appar-
ent limit.21 Hopefully, a decision to adopt or not adopt the UCCC will
not be made on such a basis, but it is such uninformed, simplistic argu-
21 Apparent interest limit is used here as there is a common misconception that the
general usury statutes are the interest ceilings for all loans but, in fact, in practically
all states much higher rates may be charged on some loans or other credit such as
"4small loans." See discussion p. 259 infra.
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ment which frequently appears as a smokescreen. This is not to suggest,
however, that one cannot with good reasons oppose adoption of the
UCCC, but is merely a plea for informed judgment.
Some of the basic assumptions of the UCCC stated in the prefatory
note to the official text merit consideration.22
First, the successful American way of permitting competition to
determine prices of non-monopoly commodities and services should
also be allowed to apply to the pricing of money and credit;
Second, usury laws imposing inflexible price ceilings on money and
credit are historical vestiges of the erroneous supposition that emperors,
kings and governments could effectively fix all prices; the need to
escape the rigidity of usury laws has led to special laws, which only
the expert can find or understand, for most types of credit transactions
requiring a charge higher than the usury rate;
* 0 4 *
Fourth, for competition effectively to determine the pricing of
money and credit requires:
a. for credit grantors, relatively easy entry into the market to
avoid monopoly;
b. for knowledgeable and sophisticated credit recipients, elim-
inating or at least minimizing controls;
c. for the protection of less knowledgeable and less sophisticated
credit recipients:
1. uniform disclosure of the costs and terms of credit to permit
informed judgments as to whether or not to use credit, to facilitate
"shopping for credit," and to enable the forces of competition to
work freely;
2. ceilings on the price of credit, restrictions on creditors' rights
and remedies, and enhancements of debtors' rights and remedies
sufficient to prevent overreaching by creditors without unduly
limiting the availability of credit;
3. administrative powers and self-executing judicial remedies
ample to assure compliance with statutory requirements;
4. enough financial resources available to the Administrator to
enable him effectively to exercise the powers of his office; and
22 A not insignificant assumption was that "consumer credit legislation should be
contained in one law so that any attorney can quickly and effectively advise his con-
sumer client." Prefatory Note, Official Text of the UCCC. Any attorney who has had to
deal with the scattered provisions affecting a consumer transaction and the multiple
statutory regulations for various types of loans and credit which prevail in most states,
can readily appreciate the merit of unification. Perhaps, too, the attorneys for lenders
and creditors would appreciate unification!
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5. a broad-gauged Advisory Council to advise the Adminis-
trator in the exercise of his powers in the interests of our entire
society and economy.
In preparing this draft on these assumptions, the Special Committee
has recognized that:
a. A combination of too low ceiling rates, too substantial restric-
tions on creditors' rights and remedies, or too great enhancement of
debtors' rights or remedies, might deprive the less credit-worthy of
lawful sources of credit and drive them to "loan sharks" and other
illegal credit grantors in whose hands they will enjoy no legal pro-
tections; it was to remedy the "loan shark" evil that the Russell Sage
Foundation proposed its Uniform Small Loan Laws; and
b. the provisions governing ease of entry into the market, uniform
disclosure of costs and terms, rate ceilings, restriction of creditors'
rights and remedies, enlargement of debtors' rights and remedies,
and powers granted to the Administrator are so inextricably inter-
related that any substantial change in one area requires a major
review of the balance struck in all other areas.
Examining the first assumption of permitting competition to set the
price of money and credit (i.e., interest or finance charge), as is the
"American Way" for other commodities such as food and clothing, it
becomes clear that the UCCC does not adopt this concept in full and
does not propose to allow the forces of competition to set freely the
price of money or credit regardless of how high this level may be. The
UCCC does set limits on the price of money and credit.23
Traditionally, governments have set limits on the price of money for
various reasons.24 The UCCC departs from this tradition to a limited
extent, but shrinks from adopting the free pricing of money by retain-
ing ceilings on interest charges. It is important to note that the UCCC
does not purport to set interest rates or the price of money and credit,
but only to set ceilings.25 In the view of the economists, deciding where
29 For discussion of the interest ceilings see p. 259 infra. The UCCC has generally
parallel provisions for consumer loans and consumer credit sales with Article 2 covering
credit sales and Article 3 consumer loans. The National Consumer Act attempts to unify
the provisions for both credit sales and consumer loans, eliminating some of the dupli-
cation of the UCCC, by bringing both sales and loans under the definition of "consumer
credit transaction" in § 1.301 (10).
24 This has been true almost as far back as recorded history goes. See RoBrNsoN &
NUGENT, REGULATION OF TnE SMALL LOAN BusiNEss, 13-31 (1935).
2 5 See UNwoPny COMMERCIL CoDE § 2-201, Comment 1 [hereinafter UauoRM CoM-
MERCLAL CODE is cited UCC].
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to draw the ceiling on the price of money necessarily involves certain
segments of borrowers or risks and is, in effect, deciding that those risks,
costs of which are above the permissible ceiling, will be eliminated from
the legitimate credit market.2 6 Thus for those risks or borrowers whose
costs are above the ceiling there would be no legitimate source of money
or credit; under a completely free credit market, money would be avail-
able to that risk or class of risks if such borrowers would be willing to
pay the high price. Presumably there would be a lender if a profit could
be made. In this respect the UCCC does not actually reject the tradi-
tional view that the price of money must be controlled, but merely
draws the ceiling at a different level from that which has been tradi-
tional.27 Too, the change may be more apparent than real.28 The theory
of the UCCC is that within the proposed fairly high rate ceilings, com-
petition will determine the price and, hopefully, keep the price of money
and credit below the rate ceiling.29
To stimulate the competition among lenders which the UCCC con-
templates as the primary mechanism to control the price of money, the
UCCC suggests several basic changes. First, the UCCC attempts to
eliminate the segmentation of the credit market. This segmentation of
the supplier market has developed as has the market, itself; as new forms
of credit and loans have developed, new piecemeal regulatory legislation
has been passed to deal with the new segment 30 This can be seen in
Virginia where varying restrictions and regulations apply to the different
types of credit or loans. For example, small loan companies are subject
to one pattern of regulation and rates;3' banks to another; 2 savings and
2 6 Johnson, Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Instalment Credit, 66 MiCH.
L. REv. 81, 106-09 (1967).
27 See p. 259 infra.
2 8 See p. 259 infra.
29 See discussion p. 267 infra.
30 B. CURRAN, TREa'ms IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGiSLATION, 1-4 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as CURRAn].
31 See Small Loan Act, VA. CODE ANN. 55 6.1-244 through 6.1-309 (1966). By the Act,
small loan companies may make loans not exceeding $1,000, and impose a rate not
exceeding 2Y/ percent per month on the unpaid principal not in excess of $300 and 1YZ
percent per month on remaining balance to $1,000 or in lieu of this a rate not exceeding
$17 per $100 per year on the first $300, $12 per $100 per year on the remaining balance,
§S 6.1-271 (1) (2), 6.1-272. The State Corporation Commission has the authority to reduce
rates below these ceilings, § 6.1-271.
32 See Virginia Banking Act, VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 6.1-3 through 6.1-309 (1966). See
also, Haymes & Phillips, The Banking Structure of Virginia, 25 WAsH. & LER L. REv.
20 (1968). Various statutes regulate the interest and finance charges which banks may
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loan associations to another;33 industrial loan companies to another;3 4
credit cards to still another,35 and so on for the various types of credit
or loans.38 Most significant is the fact that the regulation applying to
one segment may be more restrictive than that applying to another, or
preclude one type of lender from competing with another.3 7 The theory
behind the UCCC holds that these are artificial barriers to competition
among the various vendors of credit that should be removed to enable
all sellers of credit and money to compete with each other. For example,
a consumer seeking to purchase a refrigerator for $200 should be able,
assuming he is fairly credit-worthy, to obtain credit from either the
merchant, a small loan company, a finance company, a commercial bank
or perhaps a savings and loan association or credit union. The idea is
that each vendor of credite8 should be free from legal requirements and
restrictions. These include limits on interest charges he may impose,
and limits on the geographical location at which the vendor may oper-
ate, limits on the amount, type, and duration of loans that he may make,
all of which inhibit the ability to compete with other credit vendors.3 0
In theory, each vendor of credit would then be able to compete, per-
haps at varying interest rates within the high ceiling set by the UCCC,
impose. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-320, 6.1-321, 6.1-361, 6.1-319.1 (1966). Banks
may also be subject to various federal regulations and restrictions.
33 See Virginia Savings & Loan Act of 1972, VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 6.1-195.1 through 6.1-
195.76 (Supp. 1972). Various statutes regulate the charges each association may impose.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-195.13, 6.1-195.17, 6.1-319 (Supp. 1972).
34See VA. CoDE As. H§ 6.1-227 through 6.1-242 (1966). The finance charges ceilings
are set by §§ 6.1-234, 6.1-234.1.35 VA. CoDE ANN. § 6.1-362 (Supp. 1972) effective January 1, 1973 provides that a
seller or lender under an open end credit plan may, under specified conditions, collect
a service charge not exceeding 1 ' percent per month on either (1) average daily
balance or (2) balance existing on the last day of the fiscal month or any other balance
which does not give a charge exceeding that of (1) or (2).
36 See, e.g., restrictions on charges on insurance premiums, VA. Cox ANN.. § 38.1-740
(1950) and on insurance agents for credit on policy premiums, § 38.1-313.1.
37 For example, small loan companies are generally tightly restricted in the amount
and duration of a loan but are permitted relatively higher rates than banks which
generally are not as tightly restricted as to amount and duration of consumer loans.
NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE AssocIATIoN, THE CoNsuMER FINANCE INDUSrRY, 28 (1962),
[a monograph prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit, hereinafter cited as
Co NsuAmR FiNANcE MoNoGRAH].
38 Vendor of credit as used here includes not only those who sell goods on credit
but also those who "extend" credit by making a loan.
39 For a thorough state by state analysis of legislation regulating lender credit and
vendor credit, see generally CtmaN, supra note 30, at 15-123.
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for the particular loan in question whether it is for a $200 refrigerator,
a $4,000 car, or other need.
To bring about this desired atmosphere of competition, the UCCC
proposes several significant changes in the existing consumer credit
structure. First, for most creditors extending consumer credit or mak-
ing consumer loans,40 the UCCC would eliminate the existing limitations
on interest or finance charges and substitute its own ceiling rates.41 The
UCCC would also displace existing limitations on the amount or dura-
tion of credit by sellers and most lenders4 2 but would impose some
restriction on the duration of certain small loans.43 This would mean
basically that each creditor, regardless of whether it is a small loan
company, commercial bank, seller of goods or whatever would be subject
to the same limitations on interest or finance charges and amount and
duration of the loan or extension of credit.4 For the same type of loan or
credit, each vendor of credit or lender of money would have the same
competitive advantage with respect to the three factors of amount, inter-
est ceiling and duration. Thus some creditors now subject to limita-
tions, for example, as to amount of loan or duration, would be free from
such restriction, and under the UCCC would be able to compete in
areas that now are foreclosed. A significant aspect of freedom of entry
permits existing creditors now restricted to a certain segment of the
credit or loan market to compete against other creditors in other
segments.
40 "Consumer credit sale" is defined in UCCC § 2.104, and a consumer loan is defined
in UCCC § 3-104. As noted earlier, there are parallel sections of the UCCC covering
consumer credit sales and consumer loans.
41UCCC § 1-108(1). The UCCC does not apply to extensions of credit to govern-
mental agencies, sales of insurance (other than consumer credit insurance covered by
Article 4 of the UCCC), transactions under tariffs of public utilities or common carriers
whose rates are regulated or to pawn brokers. § 1-202. For treatment of the exemptions
from the coverage of the UCCC, see Miller, The Basic Exclusions from the UCCC: A
Roadmap for Traversing A New World With Oblique Guides, 43 U. COLO. L. REv.
269 (1972).
42UCCC § 1-108(2) and Comment 4. Note however by UCCC § 1-108(4) that
for "supervised financial organizations" the UCCC does not displace existing limitations
on amount of a loan to a single borrower or the ratio of a loan to the value of the
collateral or the duration of a loan secured by realty or other similar restrictions
designed to protect depositors. See § 1-108(4), Comment 6. "Supervised financial or-
ganizations" are defined by § 1-301(17) and include commercial banks, savings banks,
savings and loan associations and credit unions. See Comment to subsection 17.
43 UCCC § 3-511.
44 Whether each lender would be subject to the same interest ceiling would depend
upon whether a lender qualifies to make "supervised loans." See discussion infra p. 273.
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In addition, other sections of the UCCC are designed to permit new
lenders and vendors of credit to enter the market by eliminating barriers
to entry. Free entry is important to those creditors or lenders who
want to expand their operation to other geographic areas or locations
or to new creditors who want to begin in a given location. Many states
traditionally have restricted entry into the lending business.45 Gener-
ally, these restrictions, aside from requirements as to financial stability
and good character, have taken the form of a convenience and advantage
requirement.4" Thus a lender desiring to enter the loan market at a new
location has had to establish to the satisfaction of the regulatory agency
that the public interest would be served by a license. Virginia has such
restrictions.47 The UCCC would make substantial changes in these re-
quirements, but before examining the UCCC provisions on this, a brief
look at the rate structure of the UCCC is helpful.
While the basic interest rate ceiling of the UCCC is 18 percent per
year,48 the UCCC establishes a category of lenders who may make
"supervised loans" at rates exceeding 18 percent per year. Under Sec-
tion 3-508 a "supervised lender" may impose a finance charge not ex-
ceeding 36 percent per year on the unpaid balance of $300 or less, 21
percent on the unpaid balance more than $300 but not exceeding $1,000,
and 15 percent on the unpaid balance exceeding $1,000. In lieu of this
graduated scale, a "supervised lender" may charge 18 percent per year
on the unpaid balance of principal.49 Commercial banks, savings banks,
savings and loan associations and credit unions will generally qualify
automatically to make "supervised loans" without licensing or regula-
tion additional to that to which they are presently subject.50 For other
45 See note 135 infra.
4O See note 135 infra.
47 See, e.g., VA. CODS ANN. § 6.1-13 (1966) (Commercial banks-"public need" for
banking facilities). By § 6.1-228 industrial loan associations are subject to the same
restrictions as commercial banks; §§ 6.1-195.47, 6.1-195.48 (savings & loan associations-
"public need," "convenience and advantage"); § 6.1-256 (small loan companies-"con-
venience and advantage").
48 By UCCC § 3-201 a lender may receive a loan finance charge, calculated according
to the actuarial method, not exceeding 18% on the unpaid balance and this may be by
way of "add-on," discount or otherwise. Certain minimum fees may be charged
as authorized by § 3-201(4)(c). Certain additional charges, in addition to the loan
finance charge, are authorized by § 3-202 and delinquency charges, deferral charges,
and charges on refinancing or consolidation are also authorized. §§ 3-203, 3-204, 3-205,
3-206.
49 UCCC § 3-508 (2) (b).
SOUnder UCCC § 1-301(17) such institutions are "supervised financial organizations"
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creditors to be authorized to make "supervised loans," they must be
licensed by the Administrator, who is established by the UCCC and
endowed with certain administrative, quasi-judicial and legislative func-
tions.5' For an applicant to obtain this license, the Administrator must
find that the "financial responsibility," character and fitness of the
applicant, and of the members thereof (if the applicant is a co-partner-
ship or association) and of the officers and directors thereof (if the
applicant is a corporation), warrant belief that the business will be oper-
ated honestly and fairly within the purpose of the UCCC.52 Thus the
basic test for licensing to make supervised loans is "financial responsi-
bility, character and fitness" without the common "convenience and
advantage" requirement." One should note that as to credit sales and
non-supervised loans, the UCCC establishes no licensing requirements.54
Beyond this basic test the official UCCC has no other restrictions, such
as on geographical location, multiple offices, and transfers. The UCCC
would also permit a licensee to conduct another business at the location
where he makes supervised loans.5 For example, a merchant could
operate a loan business from the store where he sells goods. Licenses
may, of course, be revoked or suspended for repeated and wilful viola-
tions of the Act or for grounds which would have justified refusal to
and by § 3-502 are authorized to make "supervised loans." See UCCC § 3-502, Comment
1, and Comment to subsection (17) of 1-301.
51 UCCC §§ 3-502, 3-503. For provisions dealing with the authority and responsibility
of the Administrator, see Article 6 of the UCCC. See also Curran, Administration and
Enforcemem Under the UCCC, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 737 (1968).
52UCCC § 3-503 (2).
63 Elimination of any "convenience and advantage" requirement, along with the
disclosure requirements of the UCCC, is designed to stimulate competition and to
reduce the likelihood of monopoly. See UCCC § 3-503, Comments 1 and 2. These
provisions are basic to "free entry" and the concept that competition will set the
interest rate. See discussion p. 268 infra.
54 See UCCC § 3-503, Comment 1. At least one writer has suggested that institutions
making credit sales should be subject to supervision, although they presently are not
regulated, fearing emergence of "sales sharks.' See Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: An Economist's View, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 491, 499, 516-22 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Shay].
65 UCCC § 3-512. Three of the states which have adopted the UCCC, Oklahoma,
Colorado and Idaho, have rejected the official text of § 3-512 and adopted "brickwall"
amendments which would prohibit making of supervised loans at the same location a busi-
ness selling goods is conducted. See CCH CONS. CRDIT Guma 5252. One of the
fears is of "tie in sales," i.e., compelling the borrower to make purchases, perhaps at
inflated prices, of goods to obtain a loan.
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granta license."6 Licensees under the official UCCC thus appear free to
conduct business without restriction as to location, branches, and other
such factors. 7 However, one should note that other supervised lenders
such as commercial banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and
savings banks may not enjoy this freedom of movement because they are
not exempt by the UCCC from the restrictions, such as convenience and
advantage, in their existing regulatory framework.58 The main bene-
ficiaries thus will be small loan companies, perhaps industrial loan com-
panies,'merchants and new lenders who want to get into the loan field.
The third significant aspect of free entry under the UCCC is dis-
closure.59 Basic to the UCCC approach is the idea that if competition
is to work in setting the price of money, then the consumer-borrower
must be informed and be free to choose between competing sellers of
money or credit. The UCCC adopts the approach that competition
works in regulating the price of goods; therefore it requires the seller
of money or credit to disclose the price and cost of money and leave
the informed borrower to shop and choose the price suitable to his
taste. To implement this, the UCCC would require lenders to disclose,
before the credit sale or loan is made or the revolving charge account
opened, the interest rate and other technical information in standardized
terminology. 60 The disclosure requirements of the UCCC generally
are the disclosures already required under the Federal Consumer Credit
Protection Act's "Truth in Lending" provisions."1 Of prime impor-
tance, the annual percentage rate must be disclosed to the borrower.6 2
56 UCCC § 3-504. Licensees are also required to file annual financial reports, § 3-505.
57 Several of the states adopting the UCCC have amended § 3-504 to require a
license for each place of business. See CCH CoNs. CmRDrr GUIDE, 5243.
58 UCCC 5 1-108 and Comments thereto. See also supra note 47 for Virginia restric-
tions on these organizations.
59The disclosure provisions for credit sales are found in UCCC § 2-301 through
2-313 and for consumer loans are in UCCC H9 3-301 through 3-312. See generally,
Jordan and Warren, Disclosure of Financial Charges: A Rationale, 64 MicH. L. REv.
1285 (1966).
60See, e.g., UCCC H9 2-304, 2-310, 3-304, 3-309, 3-310.
61 The disclosures required by the UCCC are designed to comply with the Truth
in Lending requirements and a state adopting the UCCC may be able to obtain exemp-
tion from most of the federal regulation under § 125 of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1633 (1972). See CCH CoNs. Cair GUIDE, 30,000 (Federal
Reserve Board Letter, December 26, 1968). Oklahoma, which has adopted the UCCC,
has been granted exemption from most of the requirements of Truth in Lending, CCH
CoNs. Cumrr GUmE 1 2256, 3681.
62 UCCC S§ 2-304, 3-304.
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The disclosure requirements are designed to give the consumer the in-
formation needed to shop wisely for credit by comparing, and in the
case of a credit sale, by comparing the cost of the use of credit with
the cost of a cash purchase. Both the UCCC, and the Truth in Lend-
ing Act with Regulation Z, contain detailed requirements of what is
included in the finance charge, and how the charges, interest, and so
forth, are calculated.63 Although these provisions are quite detailed and
technical, they are thought necessary to insure accuracy and to prevent
loopholes and resulting evasion of the disclosure requirements.
Although the above changes are the heart of free entry, there is a
fourth major area in which the UCCC proposes significant changes in
what might be termed Limitations on Creditor's Rights and Remedies.
As suggested by the prefatory note to the UCCC, these limitations are
"inexorably interrelated" with free entry and the rate structure. To
appreciate the balance which the UCCC has struck it is helpful to re-
view briefly the major limitations on creditor's remedies proposed by
the UCCC.
In consumer credit sales" having a cash price of $1,000 or less, where
the seller has retained a security interest in the goods sold, the seller upon
default must elect to either (1) repossess or voluntarily accept the goods,
in which event the buyer is not liable for the unpaid balance of the
debt, or (2) sue on the debt and waive the security. 5 However, the
creditor may not do both."" Another substantial limitation on creditor
remedies appears in Section 5-104 which provides that "prior to entry
of judgment in an action against the debtor arising from a consumer
credit sale, a consumer lease or a consumer loan, the creditor may not
attach unpaid earnings of the debtor by garnishment or like proceed-
ings." Thus, in those states where prejudgment garnishment or like
remedy exists, the UCCC would prohibit prejudgment garnishment of
wages for a debt arising out of a consumer credit transaction.67 In addi-
63 Id. See generally Part 3 of Articles 2 and 3 of the UCCC.
64 UCCC § 2-104.
65 UCCC § 5-103 and Comments 3 and 6.
66 Id. In some credit sales, the seller may have obtained a security interest in other
goods, not the subject of the credit sale, to secure the credit sale. The same election
on default would also apply to that security interest, UCCC § 5-103 (3) (6). Under
subsection (6) obtaining judgment seems to be the election if the creditor sues on the
debt.
67 The UCCC may be doing no more than is required by Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See Smith, Sniadach and Sumnary Procedures:
The Constitution Comes to the Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL F. 300 (1972).
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don, Section 5-105 also places certain restrictions on the post-judgment
garnishment of earnings based on a judgment arising from a consumer
credit transaction. For example, the amount of disposable earnings
which may be subjected to garnishment for a judgment based on a con-
sumer credit sale or loan may not exceed 25 percent or the amount of
dispensable earnings in excess of 40 times the minimum hourly wage,
whichever is less.68
To provide other protections to the consumer, several sections of
the UCCC would significantly change the existing law in many states.
One of these, Section 2-403, prohibits the seller from taking a negotiable
instrument other than a check in a consumer credit sale. This is de-
signed to eliminate the "holder-in-due course problem" which has been
much discussed. 9 Briefly, the problem arises out of the frequent mer-
chants' practice of taking a negotiable instrument as evidence of the
balance due on a credit sale. The merchant then sells or discounts the
note to a bank or finance company to obtain his money promptly.
Under the traditional law of negotiable instruments, the bank or finance
company takes the note as a holder-in-due course and is free from most
defenses and claims the purchaser (maker of the note) might have against
the seller. The purchaser is obligated to pay the bank or finance com-
pany regardless of whether the seller has performed his contract with
the purchaser.7 For example, a purchaser who buys a used car and later
refuses to make payments because it is defective could still be forced
to pay the bank the balance due and could not, when sued on the note
by the bank, show as a defense to payment that the car was defective
or that he had been cheated by the seller.71 In contrast, under the UCCC
68 UCCC § 5-105. The minimum wage is calculated under the Federal Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1) (1970) which currently is $1.60 per hour.
Section 5-105 is based on the wage exemption of the Consumer Credit Protection Act,
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1672, 1673 (1972) but the exemption is increased to forty times the
minimum hourly wage in consumer transactions.
69 See, e.g., Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper,
1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 177, Murphy, Another Assault on the Citadel: Limiting the Use
of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo S.
L.J. 667 (1968). Comment, Judicial d Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a "Holder
in Due Course" in Consumer Transactions, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. Rlv. 90 (1969).
Note, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course Under
the UCC, 54 VA. L. REv. 279 (1968); Note, Holder in Due Course-A Memo to Poverty
Lawyers, 22 RuTexas L. REv. 281 (1968).
70 UCC § 3-305.
71 Id. Fraud in the factum would be a real defense against the holder-in-due course
but fraud in the inducement is not a real defense. See UCC § 3-305, Comment 7.
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the bank or finance company would be subject to defenses or claims
the buyer has against the seller to the extent of the buyer's remaining
obligation or debt at the time the defense or claim is asserted against the
bank or other holder.72
The UCCC also provides for certain restrictions on the taking of
security in consumer credit transactions. In a consumer credit sale,
the seller may take a security interest in the goods sold but only in lim-
ited circumstances may the seller take additional security in other prop-
erty.73 If the goods sold have become affixed to or closely connected
to other property, then a security interest may also be taken in that
property if the debt secured is substantial, i.e., $1,000 in the case of a
security interest in land and $300 in case of a security interest in other
goods.74 In some situations cross collateral is permitted and the seller
may secure the debt in a consumer credit sale by a security interest in
other goods if the seller has an existing security interest in those other
goods. The seller may also contract for a security interest in property
sold to secure a previous debt.75 For supervised loans in which the
principal is $1,000 or less, a lender may not contract for an interest in
land as security.76 There are other provisions prohibiting the taking of
a wage assignment for payment or as security for payment of a con-
sumer credit loan or credit sale, although revocable payroll deductions
would be permitted. 77 Confession of judgment on claims arising out of
consumer credit sales or loans also would be prohibited .7
An important consumer protection provision is the "cooling off
period" in home solicitation sales.79 In such credit sales, the'buyer has
72 UCCC §§ 2-403, 2-404, Alternative A. Alternative B of § 2-404 provides in effect
that an assignee, not related to the seller, who gives written notice of the assignment
to the buyer, may enforce the waiver of defense clause as to claims and defenses which
arise within three months after notice of the assignment is mailed, unless the buyer gives
written notice of the claims or defenses within three months of the mailing of- the
notice of assignment. Claims or defenses arising after the three months apparently may
still be asserted against the assignee. See UCCC § 2-404, Comment to Alternative B.
73 UCCC §§ 2-407, 2-408.
74 UCCC § 2-407.
75 UCCC § 2-408. Section 2-409 has important provisions dealing with the application
of payments to release security when there is cross collateral and is designed to avoid
the problems encountered in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
76 UCCC § 3-510.
77 UCCC §§ 2-410, 3-403.
78 UCCC §§ 2-415, 3-407.
79UCCC §§ 2-501, 2-502. Note that for the "cooling off" period there must be a
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the right to cancel the sale until midnight of the third business day
After the buyer signs the agreement or offer to purchase.8s  Upon a
timely and proper cancellation, the buyer is entitled to a refund of the
cash down payment, and return of any trade-in. However, the seller
may retain a cancellation fee of 5 percent of the cash price, but this
cannot exceed the amount of the cash down payment."' There is also
a three-day "cooling off period" under Section 5-204 in a consumer
credit sales2 or consumer loanas where the lender or seller acquires or
retains a security interest in land used or to be used as the residence of
the debtor.s4 This cooling off provision is based on existing law, Section
125 of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, and Regulation Z,
Section 226.9.5
Another area of concern recognized by the UCCC is the practice of
imposing on the debtor the cost of attorneys' fees by contract or agree-
ment. Alternative A provisions of Sections 2-413 and 3-404, in the case
of a consumer sale, a consumer lease or a consumer loan, would prohibit
an agreement that the debtor or buyer will pay for attorneys' fees. 6
On the other hand, Alternative B provisions of these sections would per-
mit a reasonable attorneys' fee upon default not exceeding 15% of the
unpaid debt. The Alternative A provisions embody a policy decision
that attorneys' fees, like other collection costs, are part of the seller or
lender's cost of doing business, and that the rate ceilings of the UCCC
are high enough to justify treating such fees and and costs as part of the
general overhead.Y In many consumer credit transactions this prohibi-
tion would be significant because loan agreements or notes frequently
contain provisions for attorneys' fees.88
"consumer credit sale" as defined in § 2-104(1) and thus a cash sale would not be
covered by the "cooling off" provision. For a study on the effect of such "cooling off"
periods, see Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimina-
tion of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 79 YALE L.J. 618 (1969).
80 UCCC § 2-502.
81 UCCC § 2-504.
82 UCCC § 2-104.
83UCCC § 3-104.
84Note that this "cooling off" period does not apply in the case of a first lien or
security interest securing a purchase money loan. UCCC § 5-204(5).
85 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1972).
86 See also UCCC § 3-514.
87 See UCCC § 2-413, Comment to Alternative A.
8 8 Six states that have adopted the UCCC have adopted Alternative B provisions with
modifications. CCH CONS. CREDr GuIm 5113, 5224.
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In addition, the UCCC provides for limits on delinquency and de-
ferral charges in consumer credit sales 9 and consumer loans90 and
service charges on consolidation or refinancing.91
An Appraisal
To appreciate the merit of the UCCC as well as its shortcomings and
uncertainties, some of the theory behind it needs to be examined criti-
cally. The intent of the UCCC is to remedy or at least alleviate some
of the abuses in consumer credit, and it proposes significant steps to
accomplish this goal, though some may not agree that all of the areas
of its concern involve real abuses requiring such extensive remedy. For
example, the holder-in-due course problem, the use of confession of
judgment, and waiver of defense clauses all are dealt with by the UCCC,
although not necessarily in the fashion all would agree to be best. In these
and in other areas, such as the limitations on the taking of security, the
use of cross-collateral clauses in credit sales, the restrictions on the use
of balloon payments and deficiency judgments and the "cooling off
provisions" in home solicitation sales, the UCCC would provide pro-
tection to the consumer where before there was generally no regulation
or legal control. However, one should note that practically everything
proposed in the UCCC has been tried in some state. 92 In still other areas
such as disclosure of interest rates and the "cooling off" period where
a second lien or mortgage is taken on a residence, the UCCC merely
duplicates in large measure the requirements of the Federal Consumer
Credit Protection Act.
Thus the UCCC is a broad comprehensive piece of legislation which
affects practically every person who buys or sells goods, borrows or
lends money, or extends or receives credit. Many Virginians fit into
one of these categories occasionally; many more fit into one of them
frequently. The intent behind the UCCC, praised and shared by many,
is to provide fair protection to consumers while at the same time to be
fair to and not unduly burdensome or restrictive on the lender of money
and the seller extending credit. In any legislation affecting such a broad
spectrum of the population, with segments of diverse and competing
interests, the critical question asks how the compromise and balance
89 UCCC §§ 2-203, 2-204. See also UCCC § 2-202.
90 UCCC §§ 3-203, 3-204.
91 UCCC §§ 2-205, 2-206, 3-205, 3-206.
9 2 Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 24 Bus. LAw. 209 (1968).
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between these interests should be made. The means used to arrive at
this fair balance are most important. As one should expect in any legis-
lation of this scope, it is difficult to find any group or concerned indi-
vidual completely satisfied with all of the UCCC. Some favor the UCCC
because it covers areas and problems not previously covered by other
laws, for example, the restrictions on the holder-in-due course doctrine;
yet some of these would go further in other areas, such as in lowering
the interest ceilings. Others have favored or opposed the UCCC because
it offers the possibility of exemption from federal supervision under
Truth in Lending. Some suggest that the UCCC goes too far, while
others say not far enough, in restricting the rights and remedies of
creditors. Still others apparently support the UCCC because they fear
an adverse case decision against present practices based on the "time
price doctrine" that has recently been successfully challenged in some
states.03 Perhaps some, fearing further massive federal intervention
should the states fail to act to control the various existing abusive prac-
tices believe that problems should be dealt with on a local or state basis.
The many proposals introduced in Congress dealing with consumer
protection and credit clearly evidence sentiment that may result in
further federal legislation in the area.94
93 See, e.g., State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis.2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970) (noted
in 1971 Wis. L. REv. 296 (1971); 45 Tum. L. REv. 1087 (1971); 21 DRAxE L. REv. 208
(1971); 69 MicH. L. REv. 1368 (1971); 88 BANKNG Lj. 989 (1971)); Rollinger v. J. C.
Penney Co. - S.D. -, 192 N.W.2d 699 (1971). See also Comment, Service Charges
for Revolving Charge Accounts: A Time-Price Exemption or Usury?, 71 COLiJM. L.
REV. 905 (1971); Comment, Usury and Revolving Credit: The Old Law and the New
Economics, 15 S.D. LAW REv. 304 (1970). Cf. National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen,
80 Wash.2d 406, 495 P.2d 332 (1972). In Virginia the "time price doctrine" appears to be
firmly established. See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Lunsford, 209 Va. 743, 748, 167
S.E.2d 414, 418-19 (1969) (dictum). For earlier cases see A Comparative Analysis and
Study of Existing Virginia Law and the UCCC, 17 (prepared for the Virginia Retail
Merchants Association by the firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson). The
author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of this study in preparing portions of
this article.
94 The April 1, 1972 copy of the Consumer Legislation Monthly Report (issued by
the Office of Consumer Affairs, Executive Office of the President) which lists consumer
bills introduced in the 92nd Congress contains approximately 118 pages of listings in-
cluding such bills as a TRurm N ADVERTIsING Acr (S. 1461); National Institute of Ad-
vertising, Marketing & Society Act (S. 1753); Consumer Protection Act to Create a
Federal Consumer Agency (S. 867, S. 1177, S. 1205); Consumer Education Act (S. 404);
Consumer Class Action Act (S. 984); Consumer Fraud Prevention Act (H.R. 6315);
Fair Credit Billing Act (S. 652); Consumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade
Commission Improvements Act of 1971 (S. 986); Wearing Apparel Consumer Pro-
tection & Labeling Act (S. 424); Fair Warranty Disclosure Act of 1971 (H.R. 6314).
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There is a fair consensus that certain portions of the UCCC are bene-
ficial, e.g., the holder-in-due course provisions, the restrictions on the
taking of security and cross collateral, the restrictions on deficiency
judgment in certain cases, and the limitation on prejudgment wage gar-
nishment. Many of the adverse critics object that these provisions do
not go far enough, but many of these would agree that the UCCC pro-
visions are better than no regulation or protection, the situation which
prevails in many states today. Likewise, the one area on which there
is substantial disagreement, even among supporters of other sections of
the UCCC, is free entry and the related rate structure.
There is an interesting parallel today to the situation that existed in
the early stages of the struggle to enact the Russell Sage Uniform Small
Loan Act as a measure to deal with the loan shark problem. In some
states at that time the high rate lenders opposed to the Uniform Act,
enlisted the support of many well-meaning people through the cry of
"high interest." 1r Unfortunately, today it appears that the same tactics
are again being employed to discredit the UCCC in the eyes of those
who do not look behind the "36% interest rate established by the
UCCC."1 96
In appraising the UCCC perhaps one should deal initially with one
common misconception. The UCCC does not purport to establish rates,
but rather to set ceilings on rates, relying on competition to determine
the rates, hopefully below the ceiling. The graduated ceiling for con-
sumer loans of 36%, 21%, 15% or 18%, whichever is higher, appears
at first blush quite high, particularly to much of the public accustomed
to thinking of interest or usury ceilings in terms of 6%, 8% or perhaps
even 10%.7 These rates typically have been the usury ceilings, and it
is doubtful if Truth in Lending disclosures of true interest rates have
95 Lenihan, Progress in Consumer Credit in Kentucky, 19 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoB.
54, 56-61 (1954); ROBINSON & NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SaM.L LOAN BustNEss 122
(1935) [hereinafter referred to as ROBiNSON & NUGENr.
96As explained infra, this, of course, is not true. The UCCC does not set rates.
but ceilings, and the 36% is permitted only on certain supervised loans not exceeding
$300.
97 In Virginia the general usury limit is 8%. VA. CoDE ANN. § 61-319 (1966). One
suspects that many, if they are aware of any ceiling, would believe this to be applicable
to all loans when in fact there are a multitude of ceilings, many significantly higher than
8%. See notes 31-36 supra. Cf. WHITE & MUNGER, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO INTEREST
RATEs: AN EMEnuicAL STUry OF NEw-CAR BUYERs AND AuTo LoANs, 1207, 1222 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as WmmF & MUNcR].
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significandy affected this general perception.98  Despite the initial ap-
pearance, the ceilings set by the UCCC are not high in comparison to
some existing state ceilings,9 9 which in some areas exceed those per-
mitted by the UCCC. A substantial number of other states permit rates
roughly equal to those of the UCCC, particularly for small loans.'00
Admittedly the 18% overall rate for loans is significantly higher than
the general usury limit in most states. Too, in many states, the rates
charged on credit cards or revolving charge accounts run in the area
of 1 Y2 to 2% per month or approximately 18 to 24% per year, com-
parable to the rates permitted by the UCCC.10 1 Further, the UCCC ceil-
ings on finance charges are comprehensive and include charges and
fees which under some existing usury statutes might not be considered
interest or included in the calculation of the usury limit. This is one of
the real strong points of the UCCC: its tight definition of finance charges
98 A further factor which tended to obscure the "true interest rate," prior to the
disclosures required by Truth in Lending, was the fact that many statutes, particularly
small loan acts, spoke in terms of charges of so much per $100, e.g., $17 per $100 per year
on the first $300, or $12 per $100 etc. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-271(2) (1966). Also,
frequently rates were advertised as "8%" when the true interest rate, as calculated under
Truth in Lending, would be significantly higher. See Phelps, Monopolistic and. Imperfect
Competition in Consumer Loans, 8 J. oF MARaxrTNG 382, 383-84 (1944).
99 See Shay, supra note 54, at 495. In South Carolina, The Consumer Finance Act,
S. C. CODE AN. § 8-800.10 (1962), permit a maximum finance charge of $2.50 per
month on a loan of up to $150; for a loan in excess of $150 but not exceeding $1,000,
a charge of $20 per $100 per year on the first $100; $18 per $100 per year on the next
$200 and $9 per $100 per year on the next $700 of the loan. The effective yield under
this statute, for example, on a $100 cash advance for 12 months repayable in 12 equal
monthly installments would be 51.50%. See Proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code,
A Comparative Analysis & Study of Existing South Carolina Law, The UCCC and the
Federal Truth in Lending Law 61-62, 119 (1970) (prepared for the South Carolina
Retail Council by the firm of Haynsworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone) [here-
inafter referred to as S. C. Retail Council Report].,
100 Shay, supra note 54, at 495.
101 Under the UCCC the maximum permissible service charge on a consumer credit
sale pursuant to a revolving charge account is 2% per month (24% per annum) on the
amount which is $500 or less and 1 /z % on the amount which is more than $500. UCCC
§ 2-207(3). The maximum permissible finance charge for non-"supervised" loans pur-
suant to a revolving loan or charge plan including a lender credit card is 1 y%
per month (18% per annum). H§ 3-201(4), 3-108, 3-109 and Comments thereto. This
compares with 1 z % per month on open and credit plans in Virginia and in Washington
1% per month or 12% per annum, RCW § 63.14.130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-362 (1972).
However, it should be noted that under § 3-508 "supervised" lenders, which would in-
clude commercial banks, may make loans pursuant to a revolving loan account (which
would include bank credit cards) at the "high" graduated rate of 36%-21%-15%, or
18%, whichever is greater.
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and of the factors included in the calculation of the ceiling. Assuming
for the present that it is desirable to set interest ceilings, one weakness
and misleading aspect of the 6% or 8% usury statutes has been the
failure to define what is interest and to include many additional fees,
charges, "points," etc., which significantly increase the return to the
lender.10 2 In considering whether the UCCC does in fact propose a
higher ceiling in any given state it is quite revelant and important to
analyze what fees, charges, and so forth are included in the existing
definition and interpretation. However, the small loan acts generally
do require that fees and charges be included in the interest charge. 10 3
In one sense the UCCC may be viewed as merely adopting for con-
sumer credit loans the small loan rates generally prevailing today that
have been found to be satisfactory after long experience. But the UCCC
goes beyond these acts and extends the 18% ceiling to all consumer
loans.1 0o
It is, of course, basic that for credit or loans to be available, capital
must be available, which means that a fair return must be made to attract
capital from alternative uses. It is with this in mind that the graduated
rate of the UCCC is proposed with the higher rates permitted for smaller
loans. Simply stated, "fixed costs" and overhead remain the same wheth-
er making a small or large loan; thus, to permit a return on small loans
fairly comparable to that of larger ones a higher interest charge must
be permitted. If a less favorable return can be made on the smaller loans,
there will be an incentive to push larger loans that might overburden
the borrower. There is also the danger that if the rate is too high
for small loans a lender will be tempted to double up, i.e., rather than
make one $500 loan, to make two loans of $250 each to be able to charge
the higher interest rate.""5 The UCCC has an express provision prohibit-
ing this type of practice.0 6
Some people in the small loan field have suggested that if the rate
ceilings of the UCCC for small loans, particularly those under $300
102 See CuRRAN, supra note 30, at 25-29; S. C. Retail Council Report, supra note 99,
at 36-43. Danforth, Usury: Applicability to Collateral Fees &_' Charges, 16 S. D. L.
REv. 52 (1971).
103 CURRAN, supra note 30, at 25.
104 UCCC § 3-201. As discussed p. 273 infra "supervised loans" may exceed the 18%
ceiling.
1 05 See SIMPSON, AMEmRCA's SMALL LOAN PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
SouTH 56-57 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SMimpsoN].
106 UCCC § 3-509. For credit sales see § 2-402.
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that constitute a large portion of the business of some small loan com-
panies, are lower than existing rates, the availability of credit could
suffer adverse consequences. It is urged that the higher permissible rates
under present provisions are necessary to service these small loans; other-
wise lenders might be forced out of the small loan business or compelled
to restrict severely their loan risk,107 forcing some borrowers to turn to
the only alterntative available: the loan shark. If the segment of the loan
industry now servicing the small loan borrower cannot operate under
the rate structure of the UCCC, from where will the "legitimate lender"
come? 10 8 Will more "efficient" lenders move in? If the costs of the
small lenders presently operating in the small loan field indicate that
they cannot make a fair return under the UCCC, one may conclude
that either these present lenders will not continue to operate or they will
restrict the risk area in which they lend to better risks and higher re-
turns. Whether other lenders will move into the deserted risk segment
is open to speculation. Some, of course, might view this restriction of
credit as desirable. But can one ignore the demand for loans?
Another possibility foreseen by some under the UCCC is that with
free entry other new lenders, attracted by the higher ceilings, will move
into the "above $300" area and "skim off" the better risks and more
profitable larger loans from the existing small loan companies, thus de-
priving them of the larger loans and better risks needed to cushion the
high risk-high fixed cost small loans.1°9 The effect of this "skimming"
107 This argument was made in South Carolina by some of the small loan operators
where the UCCG would mean lower rates for small loans, particularly those under
$150, see note 99 supra. There is abundant evidence that lowering the rate for any
given type or range of loan does have the effect of decreasing the availability of that
type loan. See discussion p. 260 infra and particularly the excellent article by Johnson,
Regulation of Finance Charges on Consumer Installment Credit, 66 Micu. L. Rzv. 81,
106-13 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Regulation of Finance Charges].
108 Shay has also suggested that the rates permitted by the UCCC for small loans are
too low and predicts the appearance of more "sales sharks." Shay, supra note 54, at
498-99.
109 Professor Robbins in his study of consumer installment loans showed that com-
mercial banks, as expected, are attracting the better risks. For example, the monthly
income of borrowers from commercial banks was substantially larger than that of bor-
rowers of comparable size loans from consumer finance companies. W. D. ROBBNms, CoN-
sumram INsTALLmFNT LOANS, 65-68 (1955) [hereinafter cited as ROBBINS]. Robbins,
however, suggested that the separation is not as distinct as many have suggested. Id. at
104. Another study stated:
Although very little published information is available about the characteristics
of bank borrowers, it is a generally held fact that they tend to be in higher income
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:235
or spreading around the larger loans, coupled with the lowered rate
for small loans, could drive some existing small loan companies out of
business or leave them to struggle in high cost-high risk areas. Even if
the rates under the UCCC are not lower, the "skimming" and reduction
in volume could push up the lender's costs. In considering this aspect
of the UCCC, the experience in any given state is certainly relevant.
If experience indicates that higher rates are necessary for credit on small
loans to be made available, surely this should be considered. Ceiling
levels may not need to be uniform, and individual state characteristics
and cost factors should be considered. 110
Is there justification for the higher rates permitted on open end credit
sales?1 '- It would seem that the fixed costs for making a small credit
sale would be the same as they would for a larger one, and the UCCC
does propose a graduated rate ceiling with higher rates for smaller credit
sales and lower ceilings for larger ones." 2 There is evidence in some
cases that the service or finance charges on credit sales are less than the
costs of such credit."13 If this is true, there is justification for permitting
classes than borrowers from consumer finance companies. They tend also to be
in different occupational groups. This situation tends to exist even in those states
(for example, Missouri and Rhode Island) where banks are permitted to charge
rates on consumer loans comparable to those under which consumer finance com-
panies operate.
CONSUMER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 30. See also White, Consumer Credit
in the Ghetto: UCCC Free Entry Provisions and the Federal Trade Commission
Study, 25 Bus. LAW. 143, 145 (1969 Special Issue).110 ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 95, at 266. The National Consumer Act takes the
position that "[cleilings [rates] are left to each adopting state, rather than being fixed
by this model act. This recognizes the fact that there are local and regional economic
differences which may call for different ceilings. A uniform set of rates for the entire
country is unfeasible." National Consumer Law Center, Synopsis of the National Con.;
sumer Act 1, (Boston College Law School). For an analysis of the sources of funds
for consumer finance companies see CONSUMER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at
34-53.
111 The UCCC rate would be higher only in some states, e.g., Virginia and Washing-
ton. See note 101 supra.
112 See note 101 supra.
113 In support of the Code ceilings, a careful and objective study of department
store credit costs completed in 1969 by the accounting firm of Touche, Ross, Bailey
& Smart found that the cost of all types of credit extended by stores substantially
exceeded service charge revenue received for this credit. Expressed in one way,
on a per active customer account basis, the cost to stores of credit extended was
$11.35 whereas the service charge revenue was $7.40 or a loss of $3.9S per
customer per year. On the basis of these figures, which are clearly the most
recent, accurate and complete of any available, the current average rate of de-
partment stores of 18% per annum on revolving accounts produces revenues sub-
stantially less than the actual cost of operating these revolving accounts. Conse-
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-higher credit charges if open end or revolving sales credit is to be avail-
able. Otherwise cash sales would help in part to subsidize credit purr
chases.'14 If ceilings on finance charges on credit sales are too restric-
tive, there may be a tendency to restrict the availability of sales credit
or to disguise the costs of 'credit in the sales price, thus forcing bor-
rowers to resort to direct loans or closed end credit." 5 One response
to setting ceilings on finance charges for sales credit alleges that from a
practical standpoint, this accomplishes little because costs of credit and
interest can be hidden in the sales price."" Although this may be true,
it is not necessarily an undesirable result because the most prominent
comparison factor (if any comparative shopping at all is done) is most
likely price. There is some indication that for many consumers the
interest charged or the annual percentage rate is not a significant factor
quently, the permitted ceilings under the Code of 24% per annum for amounts in
excess of $500 are almost minimal ceilings to reflect actual costs of credit and
avoid the charging of deficiencies to the cost of goods sold, which practice is ob-
viously taking place at the present time. Malcolm, The New Maxinum Ceilings
on Interest and Finance Charges, 37 (Conference on Personal Finance Law, N.Y.).
See also CLAmt & FONsECA, HANDLING CoNsUMR CaRDrr CASEs 128 (1972); Gordon,
Wheatley, Gaedeke, Hallag, & McNabb, The Impact of a Consumer Credit Interest Lim-
itation Law-Wasbington State: Initiative 245, 37-41 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Gordon
& Wheatley]. An edited version is reprinted as Wheatley & Gordon, Regulating the
Price of Consumer Credit, 35 J. OF MARKnNG 21 (1971).
"
4 This assumes the merchant wants to maintain the same profit margin on his total
sales. However, the seller might be willing to have less margin of profit on his credit
sales to gain the additional profit from the volume of credit sales he might otherwise
not gain by not offering credit.
115 In Washington state in 1968, by an initiative, the interest rate or service charge
ceiling was reduced from 18% to 12% per year, computed monthly at a rate of 1%
per month, on consumer installment plans, revolving credit plans and credit cards for
both retailers and financial institutions. Among the effects of the reduction was that con-
sumers frequently had to resort to direct loans, rather than sales credit, to purchase
goods. Gordon & Wheatley, supra note 113, at 21. If this is the result, the effect of
direct loan credits in place of sales credit may re-introduce the holder-in-due-course
problem, i.e, the direct lender, absent close ties with the seller, would not be
subject to defenses or claims the purchaser might have against the seller. This "loop-
hole" of the UCCC has been noted. See Miller, An Alternative Response to the Sup-
posed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 OxLA. L. Rav. 427 (1971); Note, Direct
Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1409 (1972). Forcing con-
sumers to resort to direct loans, rather than open end sales credit, would likely mean
that such loans would be at higher rates as "supervised loans" or perhaps might be closed
end credit sales at higher rates. See UCCC §§ 2-201, 3-508.
116 The reduction in Washington state of the service charges which could be imposed,
see supra note 115, resulted in higher prices for merchandise, and fees were instituted
for services which prior to the reduction were provided free to the customer. Gordon
& Wheatley, supra note 113, at 24-25.
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in shopping; the price of the goods may be a more important factor." 7
Many consumers apparently assume that all interest rates are the same."1
Also, if the interest level is too low and price competition prevents
sellers from disguising or including credit costs in the purchase price,
other shifts in credit patterns may develop and credit purchases may
be made through more efficient methods such as the increasingly effi-
cient bank credit card systems.119 Thus, to prevent giving any competi-
tive advantage to either the retailer or the bankcharge system, the rate
ceiling should be the same for both. This the UCCC has not done. 20
Perhaps competitive economics will tend to force a business decision in
favor of the more efficient system.
117 White and Munger, based on their study, stated:
If it were somehow possible to provide money-cost information to all prospective
new-car buyers before they arranged a purchase and loan, what would be the
result? Nothing in our data indicates that such knowledge would have significantly
changed the behavior of our respondents, and much in our data suggests that such
knowledge would not have altered their behavior. The majority of the borrow-
ers in our sample were ignorant of the interest rate they were actually paying.
All but a small minority bought credit with the car and did not shop. Most
borrowed near home and stated reasons quite unrelated to rates as a basis for
their borrowing behavior. Finally, and most disheartening is the substantial
minority who actually knew of an institution lending at lower rates than they
enjoyed but did not stir themselves to borrow at the lower rate. WHITE & MUNGER,
supra note 97, at 1227-28 (footnotes omitted).
118 Cf. WHITE & MUNGER, supra note 97, at 1222-28.
119 As noted earlier, note 115 supra, a reduction of the ceiling on service charges from
18% to 12% in Washington state led to increased direct lending. Faced with a reduction
in service charges or revenue, businessmen and financial institutions sought to reduce
costs in the handling of small loans (e.g., under $500) and commercial banks turned
to making such loans through their credit card system whenever possible because of
lower cost of handling loans of that size in this manner. Gordon & Wheatley, supra note
113, at 56. In some areas bank credit card systems, because of their relatively high
efficiency and lower handling costs, are bidding to take over the credit department and
credit card systems of major department stores and reportedly at a lower cost to the
merchant than their existing operations. See Helmick, Plastic Credit in the Pacific
Northwest- (unpublished paper on file in the Law Library, University of Washington,
Seattle, 1969). It must be recognized, however, that some retailers, despite a lower
cost for a bank credit card system, might prefer to retain their own credit to main-
tain "store identity," through their own card, and to retain control of their credit risk. Id.
120 As indicated, note 101 supra, for a consumer credit sale pursuant to a revolving
charge account the ceiling is 2% per month for $500 or less (§ 2-207), while for a loan
pursuant to revolving loan or lender credit card the ceiling is 18% (§ 3-208). Thus
there appears to be a discrimination in favor of the revolving charge account. It should
be noted, however, that the discount generally charged to the merchant by the bank on
credit card sales drafts or tickets which are accepted, is not considered a part of the loan
finance charge. See UCCC § 3-109, Comment 2. However, as noted in note 101 supra,
supervised lenders may charge more than 18% interest on revolving loan accounts, in-
cluding bank credit cards.
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In viewing the UCCC rate ceilings and the availability of money, the
rate should be high and flexible enough to accommodate the fluctuations
in the money market. Experience in many states, including Virginia,
has shown in the home mortgage area that if interest ceilings are too
low in times of high rates in the commercial market, there can be a
severe restriction of the supply of money and perhaps even a flow of it
to areas permitting higher interest rates.' 21 Although for many con-
sumer finance companies there has been a trend to move to long term
debt in an attempt to stabilize the cost of money,122 it seems clear that
availability of consumer credit and loans is affected by monetary and
fiscal policy.lu3 There also appear to be regional differences in the cost
of money, 2 4 and some have urged that rates, rather than being uniform
throughout the country, should vary from state to state.125
Other factors under the UCCC which speak in favor of higher ceil-
ings are the restrictions on remedies and on the taking of security. In
a sense these are trade-offs or compromises of the UCCC, but perhaps
they are justified. The preface to the UCCC, quoted above, suggests
that the rates are interrelated to other provisions such as the restrictions
on remedies. It is difficult, of course, to assess the effect of these changes
on the cost factors of loans and credit sales, but such unknown factors
would seem to indicate a need for flexibility in the ceiling. Otherwise
there may be a risk of serious reduction in the availability of credit and
loans. On the other hand one could argue that if the ceilings are set too
121 The mortgage loan area well illustrates the result, and perhaps even the futility,
of setting interest ceilings too low, particularly if what is included as "interest" is
not well defined. Lenders are forced, in order to realize the return necessary to attract
funds, to use such devices as loan fees, placement fees, points, deposits, etc., to appre-
ciably increase their return above the nominal interest ceiling. This also points out
the need for flexibility in ceilings to accommodate changes in fiscal and monetary policy
and other factors which affect the supply of money. Professor Johnson has pointed out
that the same exodus of capital can occur in the consumer credit area. See Regulation of
Finance Charges, supra note 107, at 103.
122 CONSUmER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 39-40.
123 See generally id. at 87-119.
124 The smaller loan companies seem more dependent upon local or regional sources
of funds than do the larger loan companies who have access to all the major financial
markets. Id. at 44.
12 5 See note 110 supra. Another factor indicating the need for a flexible or fairly high
ceiling is the fairly inclusive definition of finance charge under the UCCC, (0 3-109).
Professor Robert Johnson has pointed out "[wihatever the definition of the finance
charge, it is apparent that the more all-inclusive the definition, the higher must be the
rate ceiling in order to accommodate the same group of consumers." REGULATION OF
FiNANC E CHARGEs, supra note 107, at 105.
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low, they could be raised later. Clearly the provisions proscribing the
imposition of the cost of attorney's fees on the borrower will have a def-
inite cost, but as the comments indicate, it is felt that this should be
absorbed as an expense of doing business.' 26 The restrictions on gar-
nishment, although only expressing restrictions now imposed by con-
stitutional safeguards, 27 perhaps may impose significant costs even
though the chief loss is in terms of leverage. The same is true of elim-
inating the use of confession of judgment clauses, although how wide-
spread the practical effect of this would be may be doubted, as such
clauses appear not to have been widely used except in a few states. Per-
haps more apparent in its effect on cost would be the restriction in
credit sales on deficiency judgments after repossession, 128 which may
reduce the collection leverage and make collection more costly or diffi-
cult. Yet this cost is not as significant as it seems, because overly harsh
collection practices may be bad business anyway. 129 Moreover, the re-
strictions on the taking of cross collateral would have much the same
result. In summary, a reasonable case can be made that higher, more
flexible ceilings should be permitted to compensate for some of the re-
duced remedies and increased restrictions which may have real but
uncalculated costs.
However, many seriously question whether the "good theory" of the
UCCC will work in practice, and suggest that the ceilings will become
the going rate, resulting in many cases in higher interest rates. Oppo-
nents of free entry argue that historically governments have found that
it was necessary to regulate money lenders and the rates they could
126 See UCCC S 2-413, Comment to Alternative A.
127 See note 67 supra.
'
28 See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
129 Professor Robbins in his study of consumer installment loans stated:
After it is demonstrated that a very small percentage of accounts is charged
off as loss, the explanation is sometimes given by those uninitiated to the consumer
credit field that consumer installment lenders 'hound the poor borrower to
death' to collect the account and that explains the small losses. Again, this is
contrary to the facts. It is believed that only two institutions included in this
study follow a collection policy which is probably too strict for the best interests
of the borrower. From the experience of other consumer installment lenders it is
obvious that too strict a collection policy is unnecessary and also works to the
disadvantage of the lender. The necessity of maintaining community goodwill
makes possession and sale of chattels a hazardous policy. The low resale value of
chattels, especially household goods, also causes the lender to avoid foreclosure
whenever possible. ROBBINS, supra note 109, at 98-99.
See also CAPLOViTZ, supra note 1, at 21.
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charge.130 Advocates of this position maintain that to protect the pub-
lic interest there must be regulation of who can lend money and what
rates they can charge. Otherwise they foresee duplication of facilities;
a reduction in volume per loan office and in operating efficiency; over-
selling by some lenders, particularly the inexperienced; and wild, abusive
credit practices and ill-informed or financially irrational borrowers.131
In support of this, these opponents of free entry point to the well-
documented problem that formerly existed in many states in the area
of small loans: the loan shark. The Russell Sage Foundation Study high-
lighted the widespread abuse in this area, which abuse was curtailed
subsequently in most states by small loan legislation regulating lenders
and their rates. 32 Some opponents of free entry and the high rate struc-
ture, and the almost unlimited lending authority of lenders under the
UCCC, foresee too many lenders in the field, thus leading to unsound
loans to people who should not be given loan or credit, resulting in
hardship to the borrower, and a great increase in consumer bankruptcy
and personal insolvency. The increase in consumer bankruptcy that has
accompanied the widespread increase in consumer credit during the past
130 See, e.g., Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Freedom of Entry,
24 Bus. LAw. 227 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Harper]. For an excellent work on the
development of lending, particularly the small loan field, in the United States see
ROBINSON & NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN BusiNEss (1935).
131 Harper, supra note 130, at 227-28. Harper suggests that by adopting the concept
of free entry the UCCC has gone back to a philosophy tried and abandoned as far
back as the 19th century and "that economic theory & philosophy does not support the
concept of freedom of entry." Id. "In the period 1837 to 1863 free banking was common
and as our history shows, credit was overexpanded; competition was intense; credit re-
straints disappeared; banks collapsed; panic and depression occurred frequently. Grad-
ually we came to the realization that limits on freedom of entry were an absolute
necessity." Id. at 229.
132 See, e.g., Su _soN, supra note 105; Lenihan, Progress in Consumer Credit in Ken-
tucky, 19 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 54 (1954); Burnquist, A Regulatory Small Loan Law
Solves Loan Shark Problems, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 29 (1954). But see REPORT BY
THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMmTrEE ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FRE Soci= 189 (U.S. Government Printing Office
1967).
In the view of most law enforcement officials loan sharking, the lending of money
at higher rates than the legally prescribed limit, is the second largest source of
revenue for organized crime. Gambling profits provide the initial capital for
loan shark operations ..... Gamblers borrow to pay gambling losses; narcotics
users borrow to purchase heroin. Some small businessmen borrow from loan
sharks when legitimate credit channels are closed. . . . Interest rates vary from
1 to 150 percent a week, according to the relationship between the lender and
borrower, the intended use of the money, the size of the loan, and the repayment
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decade or so has been noted.1'3 They foresee more lenders attracted
by abolition of convenience and advantage and the ceilings which could
lead to an artificial stimulation of demand for loans or credit, and result
in unsound loans.
To consider these arguments, examination of the assumed role or
function of the convenience and advantage requirement, and the pos-
sible consequences of its elimination as proposed by the UCCC, may be
helpful. What was the requirement designed to accomplish?' The
initial drafts of the Uniform Small Loan Law did not contain a con-
venience and advantage requirement, but added one in 1932Y" One of
the prime purposes behind the requirement was to restrict the number
of lenders to encourage offices with higher loan volume in the expecta-
tion that this efficiency would be passed on to the borrower in the
form of lower interest rates.U6 Other objectives were to prevent over-
lending and the evils of excessive competition.3 7 However, the legisla-
tion in most states does not attempt to specify what will promote con-
venience and advantages 3 " or the factors to be considered, and although a
large majority of states having some form of consumer finance law have
had such a restriction,139 its application has varied from state to state.14°
potential. The classic "6 for 5" loan, 20 percent a week is common with small
borrowers. Payments may be due by a certain hour on a certain day and even
a few minutes' default may result in a rise in interest rates. The lender is more
interested in perpetrating interest payments than collecting principal, and force,
or threats of force of the most brutal kind, are used to effect interest collection,
eliminate protests when interest rates are raised, and prevent the beleaguered
borrower from reporting the activity to enforcement officials.
133 STANLEY & GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocESS, REFORM 24-27 (1971).
13 4 HUBACHEK, ANNOTATION ON SMALL LOAN LAWS 193, 53-54 (1938); SIMPSON, supra
note 105, at 90.
135 For more detailed discussion of the convenience and advantage requirement see
Sartoris, The Convenience and Advantage Clause in Small Loan Legislation-Pro and
Con, 27 Bus. LAw. 349 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Sartoris]; Stokes, Convenience and
Advantages in Small Loan Licensing, A Workable Standard, 2 B. C. Comm. & IND.
L. REV. 93 (1960). See also SIMPsoN, supra note 105, at 90-92; CONSUMER FINANCE MoNo-
GRAPH, supra note 37, at 16-19; Harper, supra note 130, at 232, in a strong argument for
retention of the convenience and advantage requirement, points out that in 1968, 34
states had such a requirement in their small loan statutes and several states had such a
requirement for industrial loan companies.
136 Sartoris, supra note 135, at 350, 355-60.
137 1d. at 351-55.
138 Id. at 350; CONSUMER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 18.
139 See Harper, supra note 130.
140 CoNsUmER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 18-19. Virginia has been charac-
terized as "tight" in permitting entry under convenience and advantage for small loan
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Sartoris has concluded that "on balance, the objective evidence does
support the contention of the convenience and advantage advocates. The
unit cost of making a small loan does vary with the size of loan office
as measured by the number of loans." 141 However, he expresses doubt
as to whether in practice convenience and advantage requirements can
assure that units will operate at minimum costs or peak efficiency be-
cause business tends to operate on a scale determined both by cost con-
siderations and revenue considerations, i.e., at a level which equates mar-
ginal revenue with marginal costs. 142 Whether regulatory agencies will
or even can promote this optimum or near optimum size and efficiency
by licensing is certainly open to serious doubt.143
The variation in state application and even within a given state makes
it difficult to assess the effectiveness and usefulness of the convenience and
advantage requirement, and one can draw no definite conclusions as to
their merit.1" However, the proposal of the UCCC to eliminate such re-
quirements runs into very strong political considerations. In some states,
commercial banking interests have objected to permitting small loan
and consumer finance companies, retailers, stores and others to go freely
into business at any location while commercial banks remain restricted
by convenience and advantage requirements. 145 The banks fear that
they will face a competitive disadvantage with these other unrestricted
lenders. This argument has some merit,146 but there are several factors
companies. See CHAPMAN & SHAy, THE CONSUMER FINANCE INDUsTRY, ITS CosS AND
REGULATION, 113 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHAPMAN & SHAY]. Chapman & Shay's
work contains a study of convenience and advantage clauses in relation to loan service
in various states. Id. at 112-14.
141Sartoris, supra note 135, at 357; CHAPmAN & SHAY, supra note 140, at 80-84.
142 Sartoris, supra note 135, at 35g.
143 Id. at 358-59. Even if a regulatory agency could determine a near optimum opera-
ting point for consumer finance lenders in a given location, it would seem there would
be no assurance there would be an applicant where one might be needed or that once
a lender is licensed that near optimal efficiency would be attained.
144 See CoNsumER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 18-19. Sartoris, supra note
135, at 360 concluded:
In considering the possible inclusion of C and A licensing in the adoption of
the UCCC, it is necessary to ask the following questions: (1) Is it desirable to
attempt to limit by government regulation the number of people served by legal
lenders? (2) Can the extra-legal market for loans be eliminated? (3) Will any
benefits from larger (and presumably more efficient) lenders be passed on to the
public? Only if all three of these questions can definitely be answered affirma-
tively should the use of a C and A clause be considered. Id. at 360.
145 See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
146 It seems clear that location and "convenience" play an important role in credit
shopping patterns. In the White and Munger study, of those borrowers who know of
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which should be considered. Banks have advantages others do not have.
Banks, unlike small loan and consumer finance companies and retailers
that might want to go into the loan business, can accept deposits from
customers and in turn, with certain restrictions, lend this money. This
means that commercial banks generally can obtain money at lower
costs than can the small loan companies, because a significant portion of
the money used by small loan companies is obtained by borrowing from
commercial banks.147 One of the purposes behind the restrictions placed
on banks is to protect depositors against reckless use of their funds and
overexpansion which might endanger their deposits. Thus, for the priv-
ilige of receiving deposits as a relatively inexpensive source of funds,
banks must pay a price to protect the depositors. Failure of a bank
affects thousands of depositors; failure of a loan creditor affects only
its shareholders and perhaps its creditors. It is appropriate to ask whether
the banks, if they believe they would be put in an unfair position by the
UCCC elimination of convenience and advantage, should not directly
attack the restrictions under which they operate rather than seek sim-
ilarly to restrict competing institutions. Are, for example, the restric-
tions on banks justified to protect depositors? Banks foresee that they
would be competing with loan companies on every corner, and with
many retail stores offering cash loans in addition to credit sales. In a
very real sense, many banks through credit card systems such as Master
Charge and BankAmericard, are now making loans through thousands
of stores and service establishments. And yet as a practical matter these
bank card systems, because of the amendments to Truth in Lending
prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of credit cards, are effectively in-
sulated against new major credit card competition. 48
In addition, the UCCC offers opportunities to banks, particularly to
those in rural and less populated areas. Those banks which are already
established, with the higher ceilings available, would have opportunities
to expand into consumer loans. But as a practical matter they may not
be faced with new competition because there will be insufficient volume
a lower cost lender for automobile loans but did not seek a lower cost loan, 44% gave
"convenience" as a reason for not seeking a lower cost loan. WmIm & MUNGER, supra
note 97, at 1227. Although the response of "convenience" was apparently undefined and
somewhat ambiguous, the study did indicate that proximity to a low cost lender was a
primary factor in a buyer's decision to borrow from that lender. Id. at 1237.
147 CONSUMER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 39-47.
148 Truth in Lending Act, 82 Stat. 146 as amended by adding new Section 132 by
Public Law 91-508, Section 502 (a).
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to support a new operation, whereas the existing banks may, without
any increase in overhead, spread these costs over a larger loan volume.
To borrowers, this may mean, of course, that in such areas consumer
credit may be more available. 149
A further political reality relative to convenience and advantage is
the vested interest of other existing lenders. They, much like banks,
may not want new entries. This has been true in some states among the
small loan companies.'5" There are several reasons for this opposition
to the UCCC and free entry.
One significant factor which may account for some opposition is that
while authority to operate is limited by licensing requirements and
convenience and advantage, the license itself may be of substantial value
apart from the going business. This would be particularly true where
the license is underutilized, or is located in a growing area where a lim-
ited number of licenses are available or the licensing authority is par-
ticularly tight in granting new entries.'r' Also, some of the smaller
independent loan companies fear that the "chain small loan companies"
as well as chain retailers will encroach. There is some economic foun-
dation for this fear because the chain loan companies, and perhaps the
chain retailers as well, with their better access to the money market,
would have a significant advantage, and would likely be able to
obtain money at lower costs and thus enjoy a significant advantage
should real competition develop. Retailers using existing facilities would
not have substantial increases in fixed costs due to expansion into the
loan field. Also, chains have the ability to shift money from low return
149 The UCCC may mean that other existing businesses, e.g., retailers in rural or less
populated areas, will go into the loan business with little additional overhead by use of
existing facilities and personnel. If so, they could provide more competition. A big
question of course, would be whether these retailers would have the resources to go
into the loan business. One of the factors in the success of bank credit cards has been
the fact that through credit cards many merchants without credit facilities and re-
sources could in effect make credit sales but yet not have their capital tied up in ac-
counts receivable.
160 This is based on a conversation of the writer with some small loan officials in
South Carolina. The strength of the support or opposition to the UCCC by all of the
vested interests appears to vary from state to state. In some states, for example, banks
or small loan companies have supported the UCCC and in others have opposed it or
at least not given active support. No doubt this is in part due to their perception of
how the UCCC will affect them in any given state relative to existing conditions.
151 This argument seems to assume that the license may be transferred or sold. Vir-
ginia has been classified as "tight" in permitting entry under the "convenience and ad-
vantage" requirement for small loan companies. See note 140 supra.
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areas to higher return areas, which could also threaten existing lenders
of reduced volume with a consequent increase in cost per loan unit.
For these reasons some small loan companies see a significant threat to
their stability, even their survival, and point out that the regulated
lenders, under small loan legislation, have been a stabilizing, beneficial
influence meeting important needs and demands. From this they argue
that this segment of responsible lenders should not be crowded out by
newcomers of unknown responsibility and reliability. Is there implicit
in this argument an apprehension that competition really might work
with the most efficient surviving? Will it be the right kind of com-
petition? Is there some vested interest which should be protected?
Whether elimination of the convenience and advantage requirement
will bring about these events is of course not clear." 2 Whether new
152A preliminary report from Utah, which enacted the UCCC effective July 1, 1969,
indicated that in the first months of operation there were no significant changes.
Freedom-of-entry as permitted by the Code, has not resulted in a rush for new
consumer finance licenses in Utah. Prior to the enactment of the Code, this depart-
ment supervised small loan companies with lending limits up to $600, and industrial
loan corporations, which were permitted to lend up to $5,000, at special rates.
When the Utah Legislature enacted the Code as of July 1, 1969, the Small Loan
Act was repealed. On June 30, 1969, we had 150 small loan licensees. On July
1, 1969, most of these small loan companies became supervised lenders under the
Code and on December 31, 1969, we showed 115 supervised lenders licensed with
25 additional offices.
As of March 21, 1972, we show 112 supervised lenders with 35 additional offices.
This includes 14 restricted licenses issued to collection agencies who accept the
assignment of supervised loans for collection purposes.
On June 30, 1969, we had 128 industrial loan corporations licensed with 53
branches. When the Code was enacted many of these surrendered the industrial
loan license and became supervised lenders. Our records now show 57 industrial
loan licensees with 20 branches as of March 21, 1972.
Since July 1, 1969, we have granted 26 new supervised lender licenses and two
additional office licenses. This includes the 14 restricted licenses issued to collec-
tion agencies. Restriction prohibits these licensees from making supervised loans
and such license permits only the acceptance by assignment of supervised loans
for collection.
In regard to your question as to whether or not competition will keep interest
rates below ceilings, we have seen no evidence of any change from procedures
in the past in this respect. Finance companies have traditionally charged the
maximum rates on loans up to $1,000 and we feel this will continue although we
do have some indication of deviation when a borrower is inclined to shop around.
Credit unions are all holding at 12% per annum, and although an attempt to
increase this rate was made by two credit unions about a year ago, this was
immediately disapproved by the other credit unions as well as the League and
such increase was discontinued. Banks and building and loan institutions still
operate very similar to the manner in which they operated prior to the enactment
of the Code as far as interest rates are concerned. Letter of William C. Wideman,
Deputy Administrator, Consumer Credit, Utah State Department of Financial
Institutions, to the author, March 28, 1972.
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competitors will be attracted is also uncertain and will depend upon
many factors such as the number of lenders already in an area and per-
haps more important, on the return on the investment compared to other
uses to which it might be applied. The mere fact that high interest rates
will be permitted does not necessarily mean that there will be corre-
spondingly high profits. In fact, the past experience of consumer finance
companies, even with numbers so limited as to suggest monopoly and
relatively high rates compared to banks, shows that their return on
invested capital is generally in line with other businesses. 5 3 These studies
indicate, contrary to some popular opinion, that consumer finance com-
panies do not make exorbitant profits.
Professor Robert W. Johnson, one of the consultants on the UCCC,
has pointed out that costs tend to follow the interest rate ceiling,rs4 bas-
ing his opinion on studies in consumer credit. "Higher rate ceilings
permit those credit grantors lending at the margin to assume greater risks
or in other words to incur the higher cost necessarily involved in serv-
ing more marginal customers." "I As the interest is raised, costs tend
to increase as lenders to maximize profits (rather to minimize losses)
tend to take greater risks. If this is true, it would suggest that should
interest rates move higher under the UCCC than the existing ceilings,
higher risk loans might increase as a likely consequence, as might also
unsound loans, defaults and related financial difficulties. It also means
there may be wider availability of credit, assuming that the competitive
forces upon which the UCCC relies permit the going rate to rise above
the present levels. Whether competition will work to keep the going
rate below the ceiling rate is, of course, one of the central imponderables.
For example, on "supervised loans" by banks and other lenders where
the ceiling is raised to 18%,151 should competition permit the rate to
153 CHAM.ANr & SHAY, supra note 140, at 143, Table 36. See also id., at 50, Table 16.
154 Regulation of Finance Charges, supra note 107, at 106-07. CaaMANr & SI AY,
supra note 140, concluded:
There is considerable evidence in the preceding chapters to support the hy-
pothesis that costs follow rate ceilings, rather than that costs determine these
ceilings. For example, the study of the nine largest consumer finance companies
show that 'the two companies with the highest charge ...also had the highest
operating costs in that the higher costs offset the earning potential of the higher
charges.' Analysis of the broader sample of the forty-eight companies reveals that
"when gross income per $100 of loans outstanding is high, operating costs per
$100 of loans is high and vice versa' Id. at 143.
155 Id. at 106.
156 UCCC § 3-508.
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:235
rise above present levels, there might be an increase in unsound loans
from a borrower perspective, although from a lender viewpoint, the
greater risk may be worthwhile. 157 Thus it would seem that by rais-
ing the interest ceiling the UCCC may make credit available to higher
risk or marginal borrowers who presently are unable to obtain credit.
Implicit in this is the assumption (1) that there are persons who
now are unable to obtain credit (also an assumption based upon judg-
ment); (2) that an opportunity to obtain credit should be made avail-
able to some who presently are not able to obtain credit; and (3) that
such persons are able to manage credit or that their failure or inability
to handle it properly is one of the social costs of making credit available
to higher risk borrowers. The first assumption is undoubtedly true, but
does it lead to the conclusion that credit should be available to them at
the high cost permitted by the UCCC? Who are those unable to obtain
credit?158 What is the extent of their need? What are their purposes?.
Is this the only way these needs can be met? In sum, is there a need
for more consumer credit or consumer loans? If one of the main pur,
poses of free entry and the high rate structure is to provide a wider
source of legitimate lenders, albeit at a higher interest rate, should the
burden fall upon those advocating such a change to demonstrate the
need for additional availability of credit?159 Is there a need in Virginia
for more consumer credit? Are good risks unable to obtain loans or
credit? One measure of the need for additional legitimate sources of
credit is the extent of the loan shark problem. If there is a substantial
loan shark problem, this would indicate that the interest rate is too
low.6 0 Some indication of the perceived need can also be gleaned from
157 "It is a generally accepted axiom that companies should not attempt to minimize
costs, but rather should aspire to maximize profits." CHAPMAN & SHAY, supra note
140, at 63. See also Sartoris, supra note 135, at 358.
158 One obvious group which might be helped by the UCCC are borrowers in rural
or thinly populated areas. See discussion p. 270 supra. Even the best administered "con-
venience and advantage" provision cannot assure that applications for licenses are made
for the place of need; existing banks, retailers, freed from "artificial" restrictions may
enter the consumer credit field without the necessity of new facilities.
159 Free entry and higher rates do not mean that automatically there will be greater
availability of credit. As important as fair return there must be funds available and the
funds available to consumer lenders are not unlimited and must compete with other
uses and are affected by fiscal and monetary policy. See generally, CntmAN & SHAY,
supra note 140, at 34-52, 87-119.
160 The basic premise behind the Russell Sage Uniform Small Loan Act was that
to eliminate the loan shark, the rates must be high enough to permit legitimate lenders
and if the rate is too low, the loan sharks will flourish.
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the rejection rate of consumer loans or small loans. One study, indicat-
ing that roughly 40% of loan applications were rejected by small loan
companies, 161 suggests the existence of a fairly substantial pool of poten-
tial borrowers who might be aided by higher interest ceilings. Are the
other characteristics of the potential borrowers important? Do they
fit the pattern of the typical small loan borrower-"young, married, blu6
collar, semi-skilled?" 162 One could probably surmise that they are near
the lower end of the economic scale. Are the needs or purposes for
which the credit or loan is sought legitimate? For luxuries or neces-
sities? 0 3 Who determines what needs are legitimate? Can or should
society determine absolutely what is too much consumer credit or
should this be left to the individual? Does the UCCC really decide
whether there is enough consumer credit by opting for freedom of
choice, -and permitting the individual to determine the cost and pay
36%1 to obtain an absolute necessity such as food, or the most frivolous
of luxuries? Does not the UCCC fail to consider whether society should
effectively force its disadvantaged members to pay higher interest rates
than its more affluent members,'" even for necessities, or whether society
should eliminate this disparity through public assistance and welfare to its
16 See FTC REPORT ON RETAIL SALES, supra note 5.
162 This characterization is not completely accurate but more of a composite descrip-
tion, as the various studies show somewhat different characteristics and even differences
from state to state. See CONsumER FINAN= MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 63-69; ROBBINS,
supra note 109, at 57-79, 126-37.
163 Robbins' study indicated that the intended use of 18.91% of the consumer install-
ment loans was for "medical, hospital, dental, funeral"; 10.18% for "clothing, food, rent,
fuel, moving," 27.24% to consolidate overdue bills, 5.80% for "taxes, mortgage, interest,
insurance," 2.69% for "home furnishings and appliances," 7.71% for "home repair and
improvement," 3.95% for "automobile expense." ROBBINS, supra note 109, at 87. The
National Consumer Finance Association study indicated that in 1958 the intended uses
were 39.5% for consolidation of overdue bills, 7.9% for "medical, dental, hospital, and
funeral,' 7.2% for "clothing, food, rent, fuel and moving," 4.7% for "home furnishing
and appliances," 7.6% for "taxes, payments on real estate loans, insurance," 5.1% for
household repairs, 5.5% for automobile purchases or repairs. CoNsumER FINANcE MoNo-
GRAPH, supra note 37, at 62. For other studies of intended use of consumer loans see
SIMPSON, supra note 105 at 132; Pennsi, A Bird's Eye View of the Loan Shark Problemfrom the Offices of the Legal Aid Society in Atlanta, Georgia, 19 LAW & CoNEMmP.
PROB. 81, 91 (1964).
164 "Poor" as used here includes not only those poor in a monetary or credit rating
sense, but also those who are not equipped to deal with the loan market on its own terms,
i.e., do not fit the model of the "sophisticated consumer" and hence pay more than they
otherwise might have to pay.
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disadvantaged members?' 65 To obtain the means for basic necessities
should one be forced or permitted to borrow or purchase at too high a
cost, or should he be provided with a basic sustenance level?
Confronting this problem in the early Russell Sage days, many real-
ized that the denial of legitimate sources of credit to consumers fre-
quently forced consumers into the grasp of the loan sharks who exacted
an enormous cost.1 6 Inherent in this recognition is the premise that for
perceived needs, consumers are willing to pay extremely high costs, a
situation that may not be socially desirable. The question then is what
should be done. One approach would supply the need by welfare or a
minimum income level. Another would permit fairly high rates that
would create legitimate sources of credit, but would set a limit on the
interest exacted. This was the principle behind the Russell Sage ap-
proach, adopted by the UCCC and extended not only to small loans,
but also to the whole area of consumer credit and loans as defined by
the UCCC. A third approach, which would maximize the availability
of credit as well as the bad aspects of too much credit and debt, would
remove the limits on interest charges. The UCCC rejected this un-
limited approach and imposed a ceiling on the price of money. Whether
the line has been drawn at the right point is of course debatable. 1 7
If existing ceilings on small loans are above the comparable UCCC
ceilings, and the going rate is also at the ceiling rate which frequently
is the case 6 s then several questions arise. Does this indicate that the
165 In the small loan, high rate loan area, is it really a situation where the "good" high
risk borrowers are subsidizing the borrowing of the "bad" high risk lenders? Are the
"poor" subsidizing the "poor"? Are indirectly these costs being borne by the segment
of the population which should be bearing the burden if it is to be borne by society?
Should the subsidizing be done directly so that the true costs are more evident?
166 RoBINsoN & NuGENT, supra note 95, at 58 reported that in 1914 in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, the rate of interest charged by some lenders was 120% a year.
* 167 At least one economist has argued that the 36% ceiling is too low for small loans.
The UCCC fully recognizes the dangers of driving borrowers to loan sharks, but
it succumbed to the thirty-six percent rate ceilings which will make loans to $100
or less virtually unobtainable.... Yet, to be consistent with the UCCC philosophy
to set ceilings and not to fix rates, a more desirable step would have been to raise
the rate ceiling on loans of $300 or less: perhaps to forty-eight percent on loans
of $100 or less, and forty-two percent on loans between $100 and $300. Shay, supra
note 54, at 496-97.
168 This was true in 1970-71 in South Carolina where the ceiling for small loans under
$150, which also generally was the going rate, was substantially above the UCCC rate.
See note 99 supra. Shay, supra note 54, at 496 stated: "Of those states with small loan
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present rate ceiling is equilibrium or lower than that point at which
competition would set the going rate; or does it indicate that presently
the type of competition espoused by the UCCC is not setting a competi-
tive rate below the ceiling? In other words, does the present rate re-
flect lack of competition or does it reflect that the ceiling has been set
at or below the point it would be set by competition?
Considering the above, one should logically examine how the UCCC
will foster and stimulate competition hopefully keeping interest rates
below the ceilings. If there presently is ineffective rate competition,
what will the UCCC do to make competition more effective? Is there
presently lack of lender competition? Is competition only a matter of
numbers as is suggested by the assumption that free entry would foster
competition? Why do not the present substantial number of lenders really
compete, or do they? Is each satisfied with its present share of the
market? Will the UCCC upset this complacency? On the other hand,
if borrowers or buyers are not selective and do not shop for better
interest rates, one of the most vital ingredients to competition will be
missing. For over two years Truth in Lending with its disclosure re-
quirements has been in effect, affording borrowers the information
necessary to shop for the best credit terms among lenders. Yet there is
increasing evidence that Truth in Lending disclosures have a minimal
effect on increasing interest rate competition. Few appear to make use
of the required disclosures. 169 Despite the UCCC theory in which price
competition is relied on to keep the interest rate below the ceiling, it is
clear today that in many areas the going rate for credit sales and con-
sumer loans is also the ceiling rate. If this is true, particularly in a state
laws fifteen would find some segment of the UCCC rate below current ceilings' Vir-
ginia is not one of those listed by Shay as having higher ceilings than the UCCC.
169 Many lenders, sellers, and officials involved with the enforcement of Truth in
Lending have indicated they believe the Act has had a minimal effect. To a large
extent the consumer remains more concerned with whether he can obtain the loan
or receive credit and with the payments than with the annual percentage rate and the
finance charges. Before the federal Truth in Lending Act was passed, Massachusetts
had passed a state Truth in Lending Law and a report on that act indicated little bene-
ficial impact on consumers. "What, then, has been the Massachusetts experience to date
with respect to consumer response to annual rate disclosure? In brief, the anticipated
consumer reaction simply has not occurred, nor has there been any significant increase in
the amount of comparison shopping by consumers. This conclusion is supported over-
whemingly by reports from virtually every source contacted in this survey-financial
institutions, retailcrs, consumer organizations and government agencies' Pullen, The
Impact of Truth in Lending Legislation, The Massachusetts Experience, 7 (Research
Report No. 43, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1.968).
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where the present ceiling under the Small Loan Act is higher for loans
under $300,170 one may possibly conclude that either (1) the present
level of competition does not work to keep the price below the ceiling
level; (2) the existing ceiling rate has been set at an unrealistic level
below the market level; or (3) a mixture of these factors exist, i.e., too
much competition and too low a ceiling. Will the quantum of competi-
tion offered by the UCCC-make much difference? Using Virginia as
an example, it is difficult to say that there is presently no competition
among small loan companies or other lenders. At the very least, condi-
tions for some competition do exist. Thus, if one accepts the fact
that presently there is some competition in the consumer loan or credit
area, and that competition will in fact work, will the competition intro-
duced by the UCCC effectively control the interest level? The reaction
of many non-economists is great skepticism. The UCCC appears to
rely on two critical factors for more competition: (1) Truth in Lend-
ing-type disclosures to inform borrowers, and (2) more lenders.
I The main thrust of the UCCC deals with competition from the sup-
ply side by permitting more lenders to stimulate more competition, and
by providing rates to insure that money is available to lend at a reason-
able return. It has been suggested that the approach of the UCCC deals
too much with the question of consumer credit as a problem of supply
rather than of demand, and ignores the nature of the demand. One feels
that the UCCC does little to affect the demand side of the problem.171
One of the great difficulties is, of course, the nature of the demand for
consumer credit and loans. In classical terms, although fairly difficult
to document definitively,172 apparently the demand is fairly inelastic;
170 See note 168 supra.
171 Professor Johnson in Regulation of Finance Charges, supra note 107, at 89 has
listed the elements of a perfectly competitive market:
1. A commodity or service whose uniform type and quality is recognized by buyers
and sellers;
2. A large number of buyers and sellers, making offers to buy and sell independently;
3. Buyers and sellers who are fully informed as to prices; and
4. Buyers and sellers who are free to enter or to leave the market.
Johnson points out, however, that "[tihe perfect market is a limiting case found only
in theory. Consequently, all markets are imperfect to some extent." Id. It is quite im-
portant to note that in this model "free exit" or "freedom to stay out of the market"
is just as important an element as is "free entry." It is at this point that the UCCC seems
weakest-is the demand for consumer credit such that borrowers have "freedom" to
stay out of the market? Compare the purposes for which people borrow from small
loan companies, note 167 supra.
172The writer's research abilities are perhaps the limiting factor here.
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as the price (i.e., interest rate or finance charge) goes up, the demand
remains fairly constant.173 To an extent this view of the inelasticity of
the demand is supported by studies showing why people borrow from
small loan or consumer finance companies. Nearly all of the studies
examined indicate that substantially all such loans are for emergencies
or what might be considered necessities.174 To the extent that these are
necessities or appear to be such (whether they are necessary in any
absolute sense may not be as important insofar as demand goes), the
demand will tend to be inelastic and fairly constant regardless of the
price.175  In other words, the borrowers will tend to pay the price
charged. To a large segment of the population credit and loans are nec-
essary to enable them to purchase many consumer items. The con-
sumer is daily bombarded by television, newspapers and other advertis-
ing media, urging him to become one of the consumers. 7 6 One signifi-
cant phenomenon which has encouraged the tremendous expansion of
consumer credit in the past decades has been the hard sell, persuading
many to consume items supposedly needed for the "good life." For
others, consumer credit enables them to procure items they otherwise
would not have and which they are persuaded by the media they cannot
do without. "Compensatory consumption" also may play a role. 7 7 That
173"A substantial proportion of the loans made by consumer finance companies are
for urgent personal needs or emergencies and are not sensitive to changes in terms
that accompany selective controls.' CONSUMER FINANCE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37,
at 115. See also Shay, supra note 54, at 513. Regulation of Finance Charges, supra
note 107, at 98-99 n.46.
174 See note 167 supra.
175 Is not this the real basis for the existence of the loan shark?
176 REPORT oF Tnm NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON Cwn. DISORDERS, 274-275
(1968) had this to say:
Various cultural factors generate constant pressure on low income families to
buy many relatively expensive durable goods and display them in their homes.
This pressure comes in part from continuous exposure to commercial advertising,
especially on television.... Most low-income families are uneducated concerning
the nature of credit purchase contracts, the legal rights and obligations of both
buyer and seller, sources of advice for consumers who are having difficulties with
merchants and the operation of the courts with these matters .... In most states,
the laws governing relations between consumers and merchants in effect offer
protection only to informed, sophisticated parties with understanding of each
other's rights and obligations. Consequently, these laws are little suited to protect
the rights of most low-income consumers."
177 Caplovitz, Conswner Credit in the Affluent Society, 33 LAw & CoNTEmm. PNoB.
641,647 (1968). Caplovitz states:
Since the poor have little prospect of greatly improving their low social standing
through occupational mobility, they are apt to turn to consumption as at least
one sphere in which they can make some progress toward the American dream
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the demand is quite inelastic is indicated by the common recognition
that what is important is not the price or cost of a loan or credit but
whether the small loan will be made or credit extended. Is it not also
shown by the harsh terms and contracts of adhesion imposed on con-
sumers, and the well-documented problems arising in the use of credit
insurance because of the captive market?17 A Michigan study rein-
forced this view, indicating that even for substantial, non-necessity loans
such as a car loan, for a large percent of the sample, interest rates were
not a significant factor in obtaining a loan. 179
If, because of an overriding necessity or desire to obtain a loan at any
cost or lack of concern or inattention to finance charges as a shopping
factor, borrowers will pay the proffered rate to the most convenient
lender without comparative shopping, then would the UCCC really
change this pattern? Why is competition not working now? Is it due
to lack of the right consumer input, or demand promoting competition
among lenders? To make lenders compete, will consumers by their
conduct have to insist that they compete? The one factor which the
UCCC and Truth in Lending have introduced which may improve the
quality of consumer demand is the disclosure requirements. However,
indications are far from clear that these disclosure provisions will have
or are having a significant impact on consumers or that they are using
disclosures to shop for the best rates. Preliminary reports concerning
the awareness of consumers relative to the disclosures have been disap-
pointing. s0 Further, compliance with the Truth in Lending disclosure
requirements has presented problems and has not been outstanding.'
8
'
of success. If the upper strata observed by Veblen engaged in conspicuous con-
sumption to demonstrate their social superiority, it might be said that today's
poor are apt to engage in compensatory consumption. Appliances, automobiles,
and the dream of a home of their own can become compensation for blocked
social mobility. Id. at 647.
See also CAPLOviZ, The Poor Pay More, supra note 1, at 13-14 and p. xxv of preface to
the 1967 edition.
178 See, e.g., Shuckman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contracts I1, 35 TEMP. L.Q.
281, 302 (1962); Davis, Etter, Blythe & Freund, The Regulation of Consumer Credit
Insurance, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 718 (1968); Note, Consumer Credit Insurance-A
Need for Regulation in Kentucky, 56 Ky. L.J. 668 (1968).
179 See WHITE & MUNGER, supra note 97.
180 Note 169 supra.
181 See FTC, REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CREDITOR COMPLIANCE wmri THE TRUTH IN LENDING
Acr (1971). The report indicates that for Region B, which covered a portion of the
east coast states including Virginia, of the sample studied for compliance of disclosure
terminology, 12% of the automobile dealers, 24% of the television and appliance deal-
ers, 30% of the home improvement businesses, 20% of the jewelry stores and 25% of the
SY1MPOSIUM: UCCC
Today, many working in the consumer credit field, including lenders,
sellers, and those having enforcement responsibility under Truth in
Lending, agree that even with the required disclosures which make
comparative shopping theoretically possible, consumers are not con-
cerned with the price of credit. Whether consumer education will
change this remains to be seen. However, to the extent that the cost of
credit is not important the demand for consumer credit is inelastic with
regard to price, and does not force suppliers to compete price-wise.
Tending to mitigate the consumer's not shopping for the lowest inter-
est rate is the fact that in small purchases and loans the slight competitive
differences, if any, will simply not appear to merit any comparative
shopping among loan companies. 1 2 Also, the difficulties incurred in
comparing both the price of goods and credit further reduce the likeli-
hood of any meaningful comparison of anything but the price of the
goods.' I8
Thus, if the demand for small loans is fairly inelastic and there is no
price competition, additional lenders in the market may not reduce the
price or cost of money. Moreover, if the price of money is not a rele-
vant consideration to the borrower, price competition may not be ef-
fective, and there may be no competitive check on the lender's effort
to maximize his profit, particularly in the high cost-high risk small loan
area and in credit sales. Competition may appear in non-price aspects
such as the amount or type of loan, terms, length, convenience, and
friendliness. If this results, what justification exists for permitting or
encouraging more lenders in the consumer credit field and allowing them
to locate practically at will? Certainly there is the danger of more lenders
generating more loans, perhaps many of them unwise, leading to financial
disaster for these borrowers.
furniture stores were in "non-compliance." Id. at 49. The average percentage of
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) accurately disclosed was approximately 75% for auto-
mobile dealers, 59% for television and appliance dealers, 61% for home improvement
businesses, 48% for jewelry stores and 69% for furniture stores. Id. at 50.
182 The demand for credit is derived from the demand for goods and services
financed. Since the finance charge is a relatively small portion of the total time
price and monthly payment, consumers are probably not as sensitive to changes
in the price of credit as they are to changes in the cash price of goods or
services financed. In economic terminology, the demand for credit is probably
less elastic than is the demand for the goods or services. Regulation of Finance
Charges, supra note 107, at 99-100, n.46.
183 This information is required to be given by the disclosure provisions of Truth in
Lending and such a comparison could be made if there is a perceptive, "sophisticated"
consumer.
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Competition among existing lenders under the present ceilings, due
at least in part to the inelastic demand and the captive market, has not
brought the price below the ceiling in many areas. Are consumer loans
available below the ceiling rates? If so, is this due to a state of equi-
librium or lack of competitive forces including selective customers? Is
there real competition today on price? Do banks, small loan companies,
industrial loan companies, and finance companies really compete price-
wise by advertising their prices as do grocery stores? Do lenders try
to attract business by offering lower interest rates? Would the UCCC
really bring about a change? The fluctuations in the interest rates avail-
able in such cases as car loans and home mortgages are sometimes offered
as proof that competition will work to keep the going rate below the
ceiling. Yet, is not the demand for these of a different type, and does it
not generally involve a more sophisticated consumer? 18 In large part
one suspects that the availability of money, and fiscal policy have more
to do with these fluctuations in interest rates than does competition.
One should also consider whether the UCCC would encourage exist-
ing lenders, such as commercial banks, to enter the small loan and
consumer credit field to add perhaps more price competition. As sug-
gested earlier, unless the cost factors are low enough to permit a fair
return under the applicable UCCC rates, there will be no real incentive
for existing lenders to make such loans. Can banks operate at a lower
cost in the small loan field than do existing loan companies? As noted
earlier the cost of money obtained through depositors is lower than
that of loan companies obtained through commercial banks, and is
probably lower than it is for many retailers. Likewise, by expanding
more into consumer credit loans, banks would not increase significantly
their fixed costs and perhaps could use their existing facilities more
efficiently. If they could operate at lower cost, would the relative ine-
184 White and Munger's study certainly casts serious doubt on the question of
whether, even with a substantial loan such as an automobile loan, consumers are sophis-
ticated in the sense of shopping for the best car loan even though the saving might
be quite substantial. Their study indicated that many who borrowed from a higher
rate lender at a $6.00 per $100 could have obtained a loan of $4.50 per $100, or % lower
and a difference in cost of $135 on a $3,000 loan for three years. Their study disclosed
that the lower rate lender "would have made at least the same loan as the higher priced
lenders made or would have required less than $100 additional down payment in 45%
of the GMAC (higher rate lender) cases and in 39% of the AAB (higher rate lender)
cases.... If GMAC and AAB borrowers could have come up with an additional $250
down payment, then more than 60% of them could have qualified for a $4.50/100 loan
at HVNB (lower rate lender)." WITE & MUNGER, supra note 97, at 1218.
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lasticity of borrower demand keep the going rate below the ceiling
rate for consumer loans? One may question the underlying assumption
that commercial banks want to further involve themselves in the small
loan and consumer credit field.'8 5 Some banks may prefer not to engage
extensively in the small loan field regardless of the return, or may pre-
fere to skim the better risks and loans. Internal competition for bank
loan money will continue to dictate that money be placed in areas of
highest return and be used to service regular customers, corporations, and
commercial borrowers.
Another aspect of the UCCC which one must consider is that for most
loans, except possibly in the small loan area,' 88 it would raise the existing
ceiling. For example, under the UCCC the general ceiling is 18%,1-7
while in Virginia the present ceiling is only 8%.11s  Unless competition
does in fact keep the price at present levels, for the majority of bor-
rowers the UCCC may mean an increase in the cost of loans. The one
who may get a lower rate is the small loan borrower in those states
where the ceiling is lowered. However, as pointed out earlier, this de-
crease may well mean fewer lenders or loans at this rate.
The defenders of the UCCC maintain that with the relatively high
ceiling, competition will set the rates. Does this theory assume that
there will be a segmentation of loan rates, for the high risk-high cost
loan, the going rate will be higher, and for the low risk-low cost loans,
the going rate will be lower? Does the UCCC assume, for example,
that some high risk lenders would loan at or near the ceiling rates, others
at lower rates, some at the present rates, and perhaps others at or below
present rates? This assumption would apparently indicate that a strati-
185 Banks, of course, do not have unlimited funds and internal competition for funds
will be affected by the relative return from various departments or types of loans made.
[Banks] recognize that sound operating policies required diversification of assets.
This principle places a limitation upon the proportion of its assets which a bank
can invest in any one field. Second, when bank reserves are under pressure, the
responsibility to serve all areas of loan demand in their community limits their
ability to expand consumer loans. Third, banks, due to the fact that they gen-
erally make much larger consumer loans, must be more selective than consumer
finance companies. Ninety percent or more of the funds of a commercial bank
are in the form of demand deposits which bear no interest. Its primary responsi-
bility is to its depositors.... The consumer finance company can take a con-
siderably greater degree of risk, because its creditors are different and its owner-
ship equity is higher. CousurmE FINANcE MONOGRAPH, supra note 37, at 31.
186 See note 99 supra.
18 7 See note 48 supra.
18 3 See note 97 supra.
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fication of borrowers or lending rates could and would be developed.
Can there be a more precise system of rating borrower risk than pres-
ently exists? Will a given lender, for example, lend at various rates
depending upon his evaluation of the individual risk? Some lenders,
stating that the lending risk cannot be refined so precisely, note presently
that in the small loan field there is essentially a uniform, one rate
system-at best a two rate system-where very good risks or "repu-
table citizens" may obtain loans at rates lower than the rate used for
the general class of borrowers. It is unclear how this variation in rate
would operate. If, as the present situation seems to be in many small
loans, there is a uniform rate across the board, it would seem that again
the case of the "poor pay more" will prevail; the "high raters" would
continue to operate in the higher risk, captive market areas. This seems
to be the most likely result under the UCCC. Although there may be
less segmentation between lenders in the various types of consumer
credit and loans, the segmentation of rates will continue and perhaps
even increase. Indeed, it would seem that the UCCC would bring more
high or ceiling rate lenders, more non-price competition, and wider avail-
ability of consumer credit to high or marginal risks, and even more
competition for the better than marginal risks. Yet for those who re-
main marginal, high risks, or in a captive market because of the intensity
of the demand, lack of sophistication, or the many other factors which
affect borrower's ability to shop comparatively or withhold demand,
there will be no relief. Below the high-risk, ceiling level of lenders and
borrowers, perhaps the UCCC offers more promise. Free entry may
provide needed price-of-money competition, but it will benefit only
those who will "play the game" by the rules, and are sophisticated bor-
rowers. It will take the right ingredients on the consumer demand side,
however, to reap the benefit which may be available. The UCCC re-
mains strong in its position that freedom in the marketplace also in-
cludes the freedom to make mistakes. It does not take a paternalistic
view by determining what constitutes unwise borrowing, what is too
much credit, or, short of its ceilings, when a cost is too high. Perhaps
the opposition of some consumer spokesmen to free entry and the high
rate structure is valid if based upon the theory that the UCCC does not
protect the marginal, low income consumer from himself. This the
UCCC does not do. In this sense, it is middle class or, more accurately,
sophisticated consumer legislation. It seems most important to realize
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that the UCCC is not self-executing in the sense that it ensures that each
consumer will get more credit at lower prices because of added com-
petition. Passage of the UCCC does not finish consumer protection.
It is up to the consumer and those concerned with his welfare to see
that free entry is successful. Clearly, a certain number of people have
always been unable to protect themselves, and this will remain even
after passage of the UCCC. The need for consumer education is and
will continue very real. Efforts and resources to remove those factors
which prevent the consumer from becoming the sophisticated consumer
who can play by the rules of the marketplace are sorely needed.
Conclusion
In one sense free entry and the high rate structure do not break with
tradition, but in the American way, permit free competition to deter-
mine the price of money and credit. The UCCC's free entry and rate
structure continues our concept of freedom by permitting wider choice
and individual determination of the "cost" of wants and demands. It
also continues the freedom to make mistakes or unwise decisions. The
greater freedom and perhaps greater availability of consumer credit may
cause increased social costs resulting from unwise individual free choices.
Perhaps the UCCC offers little hope for the marginal, high risk, low
income borrower, from a cost of money position, and does not protect
him from himself. The need to attack this problem by consumer edu-
cation and other means will remain. Although free entry and the rate
structure of the UCCC are controversial, sound reasoning and theory
appear to be behind the concept of the UCCC and substantial evidence
and data support it. Yet many remain skeptical that the good theory
will work in practice, particularly for those who already do not fare
well in the system-the poor. Whether the UCCC will increase this
problem is not clear. However, one point should not be obscured by
the rhetoric about free entry, high ceilings and rates, and convenience
and advantages: the UCCC offers in its other provisions great advances
in consumer protection, wholly apart from free entry and the rate
structure.
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